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Abstract 
 
The early 1930s saw a wave of Fascism sweep across Europe. It had a varied impact across 
many European countries; Germany, Italy and eventually Spain; were engulfed into the 
movement whilst Britain managed to resist. In Britain, the Fascist movement is considered to 
have been a minor threat to British politics but became a significant focus of conflict in a 
climate of fear about the rise of European Fascism. Though always a minority movement 
British fascism did gain support in three main areas - in parts of Yorkshire, south Lancashire 
and in London – where it posed major concerns for the British government. This raises the 
question of who supported fascism in these districts and why? 
This dissertation aims to understand the appeal that resonated with some of the inhabitants of 
Britain’s key fascist regions of Yorkshire, Lancashire, and East London. Each region was an 
area of local strength for the British Union of Fascists, at a time where European Fascism was 
an increasing concern to national security. This work aims to understand the extent to what 
some constituents of these key regions supported Mosley’s economic recommendations to 
address the unemployment crisis. Also, to what degree did Mosley’s recruitment strategies 
succeed in gathering local support and which local policies assisted with the party’s 
popularity? 
This study explores the local motivations and the nature of local recruitment, evaluating the 
events that shaped the success of the British Union of Fascists. Mosley’s militant approach 
often led to abrupt decisions, directional party changes and internal disruption, this study 
reveals the effects of such leadership at a local level.  
A variety of primary sources have been used to draw these conclusions, they include the 
extensive number of speeches delivered by BUF executives, party materials and pamphlets, 
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autobiographies of party members, public labour surveys as well as readings from speeches 
delivered at the House of Commons.  
Part of the appeal lies in the way Mosley adjusted his speech to correlate with local interests. 
Its decline may be due to how he later lost sight of his original political and economic 
visions, becoming too entwined in notions of anti-Semitism, which ultimately resulted in a 
less engaged dwindling membership.   
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Chapter One - Introduction 
The threat of Fascism dominated Continental politics during the interwar years. The social 
and economic infrastructure of many European nations had been left in a state of disrepair 
after the First World War and further economic dislocation emerged after the global 
economic crash of 1929. This global distress paved the way for the emergence of extreme 
political parties from both the left and the right. Indeed, a wave of radical change overcame 
European nations like Italy and Germany, who gave way to Fascist dictators in Benito 
Mussolini and Adolf Hitler. Frustration emerged in Britain, resulting in the British 
government coming under pressure to address and rising unemployment levels, declining 
industries and a shrinking economy, and this helped promote fascism in Britain. Indeed, 
Oswald Mosley, the founder of the British Union of Fascists, propelled himself as the 
saviour, aiming to guide the country and Empire into a position of social and economic 
stability.1  
Oswald Mosley was a member of both the Conservative and Labour Party between the Great 
War and the early 1930s, until he left the Labour Party after his economically based Mosley 
Memorandum on how to tackle the unemployment crisis in 1930 was narrowly defeated both 
by the Labour government and the Labour Party Conference of 1930. After his resignation, 
he pursued his Memorandum through the extension of the Memorandum into the Mosley 
Manifesto. Mosley expressed his frustration with the political system by advocating a 
redistribution of power that would give Parliament general control and a cabinet of five 
would be placed to enforce decisions. The decision for the government to gain greater control 
demonstrates Mosley’s personal frustration with the current system and more specifically, the 
                                                        
1 P. Stocker, ‘The Imperial Spirit: British Fascism and Empire, 1919-1940’, Religion 
Compass (February 2015), pp. 50-53. 
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barriers that prevented his policies moving forward. This eventually led Mosley to launch the 
New Party in February 1931.  
The Mosley Manifesto, and the formation of the New Party was heavily influenced by the 
government’s failure to deal with the unemployment crisis.2 The Mosley Manifesto suggested 
revolutionary economic reform and challenged the orthodox notions that occupied 
parliamentary discussions after 1918. It advocated the nationalisation of the banks and 
encouraged consumer credit for the unemployed, in the hope of influencing a rise in demand 
and injecting currency back into the economy. It also recommended early retirement and a 
higher school-leaving age to reduce the labour market. Indeed, the Manifesto suggested 
expensive public works schemes, import tariffs and a central trade organisation to break up 
monopolies. This was all to be enforced under a reduced cabinet of five, a maverick strategy 
that was not publicly consented to by other MP’s, despite it gathering some private interest by 
a small group of followers who were all critical of the government’s failure to act on the 
unemployment issue.3  
Mosley’s ideas represented a new economic philosophy which challenged the orthodox view 
held by all the major political parties in the inter-war years that the pre-1914 economic 
orthodoxy of free trade could be revived to develop a booming economy which would tackle 
the problem of unemployment. A laissez-faire approach was consensually resumed by all but 
a selection of outsiders, which included the likes of Mosley and the economist John Maynard 
Keynes. However traditional policies were so deeply ingrained into the hearts of the nation 
that Mosley was never able to offer a realistic alternative. The New Party eventually crashed 
after it failed to occupy any seats in the general election of 1931.4 After he failing to gather 
                                                        
2 T. Linehan, British Fascism 1918-1939 Parties, Ideologies and Culture (Manchester, 2000), 
p. 84 
3 J. Stevenson & C. Cook, The Slump (London, 1979), p. 197. 
4 Ibid., p. 199. 
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public interest in The New Party, Mosley created the British Union of Fascists in October 
1932, where he continued to pursue his economic ideas. However, the BUF and British 
fascism failed emphatically – not one of its members was ever elected in office and seven 
hundred and forty-seven of its members were imprisoned between 1940–1945.5 Nevertheless, 
and perhaps because of the interest in European fascism, Mosley and the BUF have attracted 
considerable research and debate. 
Jakub Drabik in his 2016 historiographical review of the British Union of Fascists mapped a 
chronology of fascist studies and how with the influence of new material, has changed the 
perception of fascism. Drabik cautiously subscribes to the argument that the academic 
historiography can be divided into three chronological groups: classic (1960s-70s), revisionist 
(1970s-80s) and the new consensus works (1990s-present).6 The first group argued the 
resistance of liberal Britain was the principal cause for the failure of the BUF. Revisionist 
works moved away from the highly controversial biography of Mosley by Robert Skidelsky, 
recognizing that British Fascism failed for several reasons. The New Consensus remarked that 
previous works had a narrow focus on the failings of the BUF, resulting in the social and 
cultural elements being overlooked. The New Consensus reveals local fascism and fascism as 
a culture, social attractions of the movement are explored and Julie Gottlieb discovers gender 
roles within the movement. Of course, not all works between these periods fall specifically into 
these categories, and the definitions of the works extend far beyond these definitions. 
This dissertation, along with other scholarly work focusing on the local impact fits into the new 
consensus. It reviews material acquired from fascist newspaper publications such as; Action, 
The Blackshirt and The Fascist Quarterly, political party pamphlets from the BUF and the 
                                                        
5 N. Mcloud, ‘Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists: A Brief Historiographical 
Inquiry’ History Compass (2006), p. 688. 
6J. Drabik, ‘British Union of Fascists’ Contemporary British History, 30/1 (2016), pp. 1-19. 
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socialist league, responses to the Labour Party survey on fascism, municipal and bi-election 
results, Home Office records from the Public Records Office, Nellie Driver’s autobiography, 
Special Collections from the Oswald Mosley Papers as well as records from Hansard to capture 
the emergence, success and failure of fascism from a local perspective.  
The thesis argues that Fascism gathered interest in Yorkshire, Lancashire and East London 
through its association with local social and economic grievances, this strength also became a 
leading contributor in its demise - for the movement could not unify and find collective 
strength. Ultimately, its internal weaknesses, its radical challenge to the democratic system, its 
militancy and finally its pivot to intolerable anti-Semitic behaviour were all factors that 
gathered greater opposition than support, combining this with the strength of the state the BUF 
could have never posed anything more than an ideological threat to the national government.   
British Fascism at the local level has attracted significant academic attention. Local studies 
revealed that the BUF recruited autonomously so they could connect with the electorate at a 
local level. By having such an interest in the local cause, Mosley found the movement gathering 
momentum in early 1930s, yet the nature of local aggravation was short term which caused 
fluctuations in membership patterns and create a general disconnect between the local and 
national movement.  
 Stephen Cullen uses a wide range of material to develop the work on the BUF in Scotland, 
suggesting that here the composition of street politics was considerably different to that in 
England, with religious sectarianism gathering wide interest, something the BUF failed to 
recognise and conversely argued had no place in a ‘modern movement’. 7 Internal problems of 
leadership and funding, as well external opposition from the left and the nationalist right, 
                                                        
7 S. M. Cullen, ‘The Fasces and the Saltire: The Failure of the British Union of Fascists in 
Scotland, 1932-1940’, The Scottish Historical Review, Vol 87/2 (2008), pp. 306-331. 
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resulted in the BUF gathering limited support in Scotland.8 Similarly in Northern Ireland, 
James Loughlin finds that the movement was autonomous from the parent BUF, specially 
designed to address local conditions, though followed a common political and economic 
corporatist policy.9 The BUF faced religious and political complications in Northern Ireland, 
resulting in several splits within the fascist movement and it consequently never gaining 
significant ground. There is a growing interest into the development of the BUF in the 
Midlands, with work on Birmingham from John D. Brewer10 and the West Midlands from 
Craig Morgan. Morgan analyses social class composition and the strength of the membership 
by focusing on local propaganda. He finds the movement gathered ideological support from 
the Midlands, but argues the sympathy found for the BUF failed to extend to the approval of 
Mosleyites and the militant actions of the BUF.11 A similar story is told by Phillip Coupland 
in the case of Northampton. Coupland suggests the movement in Northampton relied heavily 
on the local leadership.12  The BUF in Northampton had a small representation of four members 
during 1934, whilst the rest of the nation was seeing a surge in membership, where it was 
reported as high as 50,000 across the nation.13 It was only after a visit from Oswald Mosley 
and the appointment of Branch Organiser, Harry Frisby that the movement began to take shape. 
Similar recruitment trends are evident when reviewing BUF activity across English towns. 
During Mosley’s first speech he suggest the boot and shoe export industry, which had supplied 
Northampton with fortune, had almost vanished. He promised a home market substitute for 
                                                        
8 Ibid., p. 331. 
9 J. Loughlin, ‘Northern Ireland and British Fascism in the Inter-War Years’, Irish Historical 
Studies, Vol. 29, No. 116 (November 1995), pp. 537-552 
10 J. D. Brewer, ‘The British Union of Fascists, Sir Oswald Mosley and Birmingham: An 
analysis of the Content and Context of an ideology’ (MSocSc, University of Birmingham, 
1975) 
11 C. Morgan, ‘The British Union of Fascists in the Midlands, 1932-1940’ (University of 
Wolverhampton, 2008), p. 91.  
12 P. M. Coupland, 'The Blackshirts in Northampton, 1933–1940’, Northamptonshire Past 
and Present, Vol.53 (2000), pp. 71-82. 
13 The National Archives in the Public Records Office, HO144/20141. 
12 
 
foreign trade, via Empire autarchy.14 This began to ignite recruitment, Coupland reported 
membership had doubled soon after his visit. Local studies reveal recruitment patterns and their 
effect in penetrating the electorate, Mosley targeted local grievances and aimed to provide an 
imperial solution. Whilst this was highly effective in the short term, the changing tides of the 
economy resulted in fluid membership figures. 
Other local studies have examined oral material to understand the depth of fascism, Stuart 
Rawnsley interviewed former BUF members and Tom Linehan in his research into East 
London conducted a series of oral interviews. These interviews help build a picture of fascist 
perspectives, yet they hold limited value for the time between the events could distort one’s 
memory, additionally the fear of association with continental fascism may have had an 
influence.15  
Writings on British Fascism in the age of the new consensus has opened new debates on a 
variety of topics. Julie Gottlieb has explored several avenues, often looking beyond the extent 
of the BUF’s electoral and ideological failings. Gottlieb has driven the historiography forward 
by focusing on the feminist fascist, the BUF’s use of political marketing and technology and 
the impact of body fascism. The works on the feminist fascist revealed several previously 
unexplored themes, Gottlieb suggests the women attracted to the fascist movement were not 
divided into ‘traditionalist’ or ‘fascist feminists’, but were united in support of fascism defined 
by men.16 The BUF offered women political participation and valued their devotion and 
contribution to leadership.17 
                                                        
14 P. M. Coupland, 'The Blackshirts in Northampton, 1933–1940’, pp. 71-82. 
15 S. Rawnsley, ‘Membership of the British Union of Fascists’, Thurlow and Lunn, British 
Fascism, (London, 1980), p. 154. 
16 P. Lassner, Review: J. Gottlieb, Feminine Fascism: Women in Britain’s Fascist Movement 
1923–1945, Women's History Review, 03/2002, Vol 11/ 1, pp. 133 – 160. 
17 N. Gullace, Review: J. Gottlieb, Feminine Fascism: Women in Britain's Fascist Movement 
1923–1945, Twentieth Century British History, Vol 13/ 3, (2002), pp. 320–322 
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Gottlieb’s research into the BUF’s use of political technology suggests the movement 
combined the intellectual property of the continental fascism with British populist and celebrity 
culture to form a new image of Fascism, a fashion.18 Mosley expressed himself through 
militancy, he trained members to fight, wore a ‘soldier-like’ uniform and paraded himself as 
the saviour to all local and national grievances. Mosley attempted to connect with individuals 
through the fanaticism of the uniform and its aesthetic brutality.19 Mosley created an offensive 
weapon, fuelled by its voyeuristic appeal and populist politics.  
Gottlieb develops this notion of body fascism in a more recent article, ‘Body Fascism in 
Britain: Building the Blackshirt in the Inter-War Period’20. To be a ‘body fascist’ in Gottlieb’s 
terms, is to be a man or a woman pre-occupied with outward appearance and aesthetic self-
perfection21. However, she argues that Fascism carried more style than substance. Mosley built 
a fashion, suppressed by its failed electoral success, its internal dilemmas and the strength and 
resistance of the public and state. Helen Pussard in her MA thesis, ‘A mini-Blackpool’ explores 
the appropriation of the Blackshirt culture with a specific focus on the BUF meeting at Belle 
Vue, Manchester in 1934. She found through the depiction of the Belle Vue meeting, that the 
BUF showcased their uniform, militancy, platform oratory and other forms of culture to create 
a political marketing tool, sought to flaunt the man ship of the Blackshirt culture.22 
Paul Stocker has brought new attention to the BUF and imperialism. Stocker argues scholarly 
interest in the BUF’s imperial vision has been negligible. He agrees that it has been subject to 
                                                        
18 J. Gottlieb, ‘The Marketing of Megalomania: Celebrity, Consumption and the 
Development of Political Technology in the British Union of Fascists’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol 41/1 (2006), pp. 35-55. 
19 J. Gottlieb, ‘Body Fascism in Britain: Building the Blackshirt in the Inter-War Period’, 
Contemporary European History, 20/2 (2011), p. 136. 
20 Ibid., pp. 111-136. 
21 Ibid., p. 112. 
22 H. Pussard, ‘A mini-Blackpool: Belle Vue and the cultural politics of pleasure and leisure 
in inter-war Manchester’, (unpublished thesis, University of Manchester, 1997). 
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debate in terms of economics, citing writings from Skidelsky, Linehan and Pugh.23 Yet there 
is room for discussion beyond the assumption that the BUF’s attachment to the Empire was 
derivative of conservative imperialists who sought to economically unite the Empire to protect 
British industry from Global economic downturns. Imperialism, whilst almost always going 
hand in hand with British fascism, took different forms and the extent to which fascist parties 
in Britain were considered imperialistic differs considerably.  
The Empire was at the centre of the BUF’s ideology, Mosley himself considered the BUF as 
the only possible saviour to Britain and its Empire.24 William Joyce recognised the Empire as 
testament to Britain’s greatness, and a renewal of imperial vigour was needed to reassert these 
values on Britain. Joyce wanted to foster imperial unity through totalitarianism and he blamed 
the decline in imperial values on democratic politics, political corruption and parasitical forces, 
such as Jews who were decaying the Empire from within.25  
The BUF stressed the importance of imperialism in both foreign and domestic policy. Gordon 
Canning, the BUF’s Director of Overseas Policy argued that only once Britain had achieved 
imperial unity, could they carry weight in European and World councils. Unity was defined by 
all the dominion nations being closer to the mother land. The BUF also sought to make the 
Empire relevant domestically, campaigning to the working classes the economic benefits of 
Imperial trade.26  
Mosley’s BUF created greater nationwide resistance than support. Nonetheless, Mosley’s 
economic ideas struck a chord in three regions; Yorkshire, Lancashire and East London. 
These regions shared economic uncertainty like the rest of the nation, but were not the worst 
                                                        
23 Stocker, ‘The Imperial Spirit: British Fascism and Empire, 1919-1940’, pp. 50-53. 
24 O. Mosley, The Greater Britain (London, 1932).  
25 W. Joyce, ‘Britain’s Empire Shall Live’ The Fascist Quarterly (1935), pp. 91-107. 
26 Yorkshire Betrayed, political pamphlet 1939. 
15 
 
affected by the depression. The support for the BUF from each of the focused regions was 
both economic and ideological, but unique to that locality. Each area shared a high Jewish 
population, which later became focal to the BUF campaign. 
Colin Cross estimated that the BUF membership was at its largest in 1934, totalling 40,000 
prior to the events that unfolded at the Olympia disturbances of June 1934. G. C. Webber and 
Robert Skidelsky challenge the figure, for they believe the membership figures were around 
10,000 higher.27 
When studying the success of British Fascism, it is easy to undervalue the threat of the 
movement due to the strength of the state, the British public’s commitment to parliament, 
democracy and to the rule of law. Classic studies challenged this ideology, with works from 
Skidelsky looking at Mosley’s character as a cult figure. Skidelsky heavily sympathised with 
Mosley, he attempted to draw on his success and underplayed the fascist association with 
anti-Semitism, suggesting it was a response to the reaction of the working class Jews.28 
Skidelsky is heavily criticised for his bias, new evidence from Daniel Tillie’s suggests the 
movement was inherently anti-Jewish even before it formed a large Jewish resistance.  
Interest for the BUF in Yorkshire, Lancashire and East London stemmed from Mosley’s 
adaptability to link local grievances with his economic policy. Mosley saw opportunity in 
connecting with local communities to drum up support. An example of this can be found 
through the BUF’s recognition of the social suffering from the decline of Lancashire’s cotton 
trade. Cyclical depression caused an influx in unemployment in Lancashire and to win over 
the regions support, the BUF promised to provide employment to the disgruntled cotton 
                                                        
27 G. C. Webber, ‘Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 19, No. 4, Reassessments of Fascism (1984), pp. 579-
580. 
28  K. Lunn and R. Thurlow, British Fascism, R. Skidelsky, ‘Reflections on Mosley and 
British Fascism’, (London, 1980), p. 79. 
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workers. Mosley attracted interest through social opportunities; the Woodhouse School of 
Physical Culture in Leeds provided members to train as stewards, it also provided a social 
identity that influenced recruitment within the area pre-1934.29 Mosley also connected with 
individuals on an economic basis, where he pledged his support in local aggregations; he 
spoke about agriculture in a speech delivered to crowds in York in 1934, then later declared 
his support for the declining furniture manufacturing trade in Leeds, 1937.30 He was 
committed to identifying with the roots of local regions in order to win their support.  
British Fascism developed at a varying pace across different regions because of the 
fluctuating economic conditions. The industrial layout and social composition of the certain 
regions played a role in the rise of fascism. Regions with high unemployment and declining 
trade like in Lancashire, identified with the BUF as they attempted to appeal directly with 
local causes. The BUF shaped their campaign and policies around the problems of the regions 
in which they contested, they often backed local campaigns and bolted onto other movements 
to capture a greater reach. 
This strategy was not effective across all suffering regions. Jarrow suffered from 
unemployment levels of above 80 per cent, yet they showed little interest in Fascism.31 The 
recession had a devastating impact on multiple regions, but we cannot simply assume it led to 
a substantial increase in Fascism. Mosley made no ground in Jarrow, his manifesto and 
commitment to solving the unemployment crisis failed to resonate with even the most volatile 
local economies. Those who marched in the Jarrow Crusade did so alongside Ellen 
                                                        
29 Trevelyan Scholarship Report, The British Union of Fascists in Yorkshire 1934-40 (1960), 
Figures taken from the Jewish Year Book 1934, held in the University of Bradford, p. 3. 
30 Yorkshire Post, 10th April 1934 & 3rd February 1937. 
31 E. Wilkinson, The town that was murdered (London, 1939), pp. 191-192. 
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Wilkinson, the Labour MP as well as members of the National Union of Workers’ 
Movement, who had close ties to the Communist Party.32 
The governments of the interwar years were riddled with the persistent problem of 
unemployment. The fundamental issue of the governments in the run up to the 1930s was that 
they consensually accepted the necessity to return to the gold standard in 1925 as a method to 
stimulate the world economy. A return to the gold standard would denote Britain's return to 
free trade. It was widely considered that by returning to gold standard to regulate the 
economy, other foreign countries would follow suit and allow free trade, thus fuel world trade 
and subsequently unemployment levels would eventually decline. 
John Stevenson and Chris Cook argue that the British economy grew during the interwar 
years, which influenced a rise in living standards in some districts of the country.33 The 
conditions of the working population were on the rise in southern areas of the country. John 
Newsinger agrees with Stevenson and Cook when reflecting on the state of the British 
economy in the 1930s. He suggests that the economy was not as critically affected as was 
expected, resulting in British Fascism not having the influence of a complete financial 
collapse and widespread political confusion like other countries in Europe had.34 
Nevertheless there were roughly three million unemployed individuals during the interwar 
years. Without a nationwide economic crisis, Fascism would not have risen as it did in the 
1930s. 
The state of the economy and the lack of compassion with orthodox economic policies played 
a significant role in increasing Fascist support. Had the British economy suffered as 
significantly as Germany or Italy, then Britain may have been much more vulnerable to the 
                                                        
32 MEPO 2/3097, Ministry of Labour to the Home Office, 26th September 1936. 
33 Stevenson & Cook, The Slump, pp. 51-52 
34 J. Newsinger, ‘Race Class’ Sage Journals January 2006, vol 47/3, pp. 98-101. 
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rise of Fascism. That said, the British public was exposed to a popular left-wing movement in 
the form of the NUWM and the Communist Party that was successful to some degree in 
identifying with the working classes. 
To understand the rise, fall and failure of British Fascism it is helpful to examine both where 
and why support arose in the regions it did and the reactions of violence it attracted. Indeed, 
one must identify the regional locations of the movements’ followers and examine whether 
the social and economic environment played a part in the recruitment process. Furthermore, 
the challenge to fascism by the Jewish population, the Communists and other Anti-Fascist 
groups must also be considered when understanding the development of the movement. It can 
be argued on one hand that the anti-Fascist resistance played a role in fuelling the growth of 
the BUF at a local level, it led to an increase in exposure, violence and political barbarism. 
On the other hand, the rise of anti-Semitism led to an increased resistance from Jewish Anti-
Fascists and stimulated greater unification between the anti-fascist groups built from the 
working class community, the Jewish population and the Communist Party.  
Laybourn, Dorril and others suggest the movement gained a following in Lancashire, East 
London and its northern counterpart Leeds because of the growing number of Jews who 
resided there. Leeds inhabited a Jewish community of around 25,00035, Mosley sought to 
drum unrest between the local and Jewish communities through Jew-baiting and anti-Semitic 
regimes.36  
The BUF often invited anti-Jewish, and sometimes anti-Semitic, feelings into their local 
campaign, connecting with each region and adapting its policy to identify with the local 
suffering. Mosley developed a strong and committed following on the back of various social 
                                                        
35 Trevelyan Scholarship Report, The British Union of Fascists in Yorkshire 1934-40 (1960), 
Figures taken from the Jewish Year Book 1934, held in the University of Bradford.  
36 S. Dorril, Blackshirt (London, 2007), p. 165 
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and political anxieties. Mosley used his platform to reach as far as he could in East London, 
supporting residents who were uneasy with the increasing levels of Jewish immigration. In 
taking this anti-Jewish stance, the BUF struck a nerve within the community, forming both 
support and a variety of opposition.  
Joe Jacobs, a young tailor and member of the Young Communist League who went on to 
become secretary of the Stepney Communist branch at the age of 22 formed part of this 
opposition. In his autobiography, Jacobs details the internal divisions within the Communist 
Party around how to contain Mosley, many of whom were prepared to go to great lengths to 
resist Fascism.37 The violent perspective from both sides, suggests many within each 
movement, believed achieving support and success was paramount to defeating one another 
on the streets. Advocating violence prevented any parliamentary success for both the BUF 
and the Communist Party. The Jewish elite community was opposed to demonstrating any 
form of violence and actively worked with the police and the Home Office to contain the 
behaviour of militant Jews. 
Daniel Tille’s brings new attention to the impact and response to anti-Semitism in Jewish 
communities. Tille’s suggests that the BUF was founded with antisemitism absent from its 
programme, attempting to mirror the Italian totalitarian regime, which Mosley based his 
movement on. Yet, he attempts to prove that anti-Semitism was central to the movement, 
challenging the notion that anti-Semitism derived out of Jewish provocation as not justified. 
Tille’s analyses anti-Semitic articles published in fascist newspapers to support his claim that 
anti-Semitic feeling was continual, yet maintained sharp fluctuations in intensity, peaking in 
1936. Such fluctuations corroborate with the notion that the movement was opportunistic, 
                                                        
37 J. Jacobs, Out of the Ghetto (London, 1978), p. 57. 
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clearly demonstrated through the way it handled matters according to its changing 
circumstances as well as local issues.  
Tille’s analyses the Jewish elitist response to the emergence of fascism in early 1930s through 
the Jewish Chronicle, a newspaper that he suggests represented the Jewish community and 
moreover the Jewish elites. 38 Tille’s tackles the notion that pre-1935 the voice of the Jewish 
leadership was unsympathetic to the plight of the working-class Jews who experienced fascist 
anti-Semitism. Tille’s provides evidence that suggests responses to the BUF pre-date the arrival 
of the BUF in the East-End. Tille’s argues that the Jewish establishment did not feel the BUF 
presented enough of a threat to warrant a drawn-out discussion. What’s clear from Tille’s study, 
is the Jewish elite monitored the situation to understand the depth of fascist anti-Semitic 
behaviour on the street, communicating with the BUF to determine their standpoint on specific 
events that were taking place. One such event Tille’s presents came from a BUF meeting in 
London’s Memorial hall in late October 1932, where Mosley confronted two Jewish hecklers 
with the retort that they should ‘go back to Jerusalem’. The Jewish Chronicle was quick to 
respond criticising Mosley for commenting on their Jewishness. Soon after, the Jewish 
Chronicle expressed relief after reviewing Mosley’s response to the situation, where he labelled 
in the Blackshirt, that antisemitism was an irrelevance and commented that ‘Jew-baiting in 
every shape or form [had been] forbidden’.39 Tille’s builds a pre-1935 narrative to support 
numerous counts of activity of similar occurrences, where the BUF expressed isolated incidents 
of anti-Semitism then reassured the Jewish community. What’s clear is that the Jewish 
Chronicle and the rest of the Jewish elite were slow to recognise the BUF’s flight towards 
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Hitlerism. Only when it did, when the BUF adopted an openly anti-Jewish stance in the East 
End of London, did it call for a more active role in responding to anti-Semitism.40  
Even after Mosley advocated an openly anti-Jewish policy, the Jewish community remained 
divided in their response to the BUF. The most visible retort derived from the militant 
antifascists, who sought to engage in conflict with the BUF through street violence and 
disrupting of demonstrations. The Board of Deputies represented the Jewish elite, who came 
under criticism for their formal approach in dealing with anti-Semitic behaviour.  
Scholars have criticised the Anglo-Jewish elite for being unsympathetic and ineffective. Paying 
greater attention to policing the Jewish community and preventing the exacerbation of anti-
Semitism than countering the fascist anti-Semitism. Geoffrey Alderman41 and Elaine Smith42 
go as far to suggest the passive actions of the elite Jewish community influenced and 
strengthened anti-Semitism. One of the first controversial actions taken by the newly 
established Co-ordinating Committee (CoC), a body created in response to anti-Semitism in 
1936, fuelled the notion supported by Alderman and Smith. The CoC launched a propaganda 
campaign with two objectives, the first to counter anti-Semitic claims and the second was to 
inform the public of the positive contributions the Jewish community had made to society. A 
method criticised as being apologetic to the British public and was to some degree interpreted 
as an acceptance of being a second-class citizen. Tilles and Copsey support the argument the 
Jewish elite needed to combat the ignorance of the anti-Semite, refuting fascist accusations for 
fear the public may have interpreted them as the truth.43  
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Tilles and Copsey go further to criticise previous scholarly work for ignoring the Board’s 
archives, focusing only on the perspective of the ‘East End’ Jewish perspective.44 Other 
strategies deployed by the CoC not only aimed to shape the gentile opinion of the Jew, but 
were also designed to prevent the Jewish community from involving themselves with militant 
antifascism. The Jewish antifascist militancy was fuelling the publicity of the BUF and 
supported their claim that anti-Semitism was a reaction to the victimisation by Jews.  
Anti-Semitism can be perceived to have influenced the awareness of fascism, but it 
contributed more opposition than support, which ultimately influenced further state 
intervention that suppressed the growth and existence of the BUF. 
Stuart Rawnsley conducted a series of interviews with former fascist members and 
sympathisers. He went on to describe the membership of the movement as an undefined 
collection of individuals.45 In an interview conducted with John Charnley, a former member 
of the BUF in Southport and Hull, who was later imprisoned under the Defence Regulation 
18b in 1940, Rawnsley identifies the diverse affiliations of the Hull members. Charnley 
became district leader of Hull. By 1936 he had counted the unemployed working-class 
members as high as forty per cent out of a total of 268 in 1936. He also commented on the 
affiliations of the local members, describing ‘thirty per cent disenchanted; fifty to fifty-five 
per cent politically motivated, ten to fifteen per cent who approved of Oswald Mosley’s 
philosophy’, a quote that suggests many different factors directing people towards the 
ideology of Fascism.46 Charnley’s experience within the Hull regions reinforces Rawnsley’s 
notion of the movement being of a heterogeneous nature. 
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Rawnsley found further support for his suggestion in Nellie Driver’s autobiography. Driver 
goes on to further decree that district leaders had great difficulty in getting the members to 
salute them publicly or privately.47 Without the members acknowledging their political 
position, there was little chance of the movement finding momentum.  
Rawnsley concluded that the Fascist movement itself was blind to the type of audience it 
attracted. Rawnsley hypothesis carries weight in the early years of the movement as Mosley 
identified with localities based on their specific grievances, whether this was social, 
ideological or economic. The BUF attempted to recruit people from all classes and tried to 
create a ‘classless’ following using a uniform, propaganda and cult-like behaviour. Post-
1936, Mosley was conscious that he needed to move away from the militancy if the party 
stood any chance of democratic success.48  
It has been argued that people joined the British Union of Fascists as an expression of revolt 
to mainstream politics. Julie Gottlieb suggests the movement attracted a diverse range of 
individuals, from former Conservatives and Labour members, criminals and street hooligans, 
as well as women.49 Fascist ideologies could intentionally appeal across all sections of the 
political spectrum, bringing Fascism to the forefront of mainstream national politics was so 
far in the distance, it could not afford to eliminate any group from its proposed following. 
Rawnsley suggests the movement had an impact in northern areas of the country due to the 
local industries suffering from economic hardship, whilst also seeing an increase in Jewish 
inhabitants. G. C. Webber attempts to draw different scenarios to demonstrate the most 
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popular areas of Fascist support, yet the sources available to exemplify this popularity, only 
concern the active members, which provides a limited perspective. The areas of support are 
determined by the popularity of meetings, and the subsequent violence that occurred at such 
events. This does not necessarily suggest these areas were a Fascist stronghold, it could also 
relate as Webber suggests, to an area of high communist/ anti-fascist support. 
G. C. Webber suggests that the middle class predominantly occupied the movement 
particularly after 1936 when the Public Order Act was passed, tightening control of how the 
Fascist party represented itself on the street. Webber goes on further to suggest the movement 
was fighting against the threat of communism rather than revolting because of economic 
suffering. This suggests most supporters were politically motivated and agrees with the 
comments made by John Charnley, but it tells us little about the class divisions within the 
movement.  
Thomas Linehan argues that the quality of the material available is hardly sufficient in 
understanding the different members of the movement, for most of the registers only contain 
the information of active members, a decision made in 1937 to conceal the identities of non-
active recruits.50 Local BUF branches also attempted to conceal the identities of the local 
members by hastily destroying the registers that existed in local branches. Consequently, the 
conclusions that have been drawn regarding the membership of the British Union of Fascists 
has been the work of estimations, pieced together by police reports and other outlets.  
Fascism in Britain was supported by a diverse range of people, drawn to it for many different 
reasons. The members of the BUF were politically, ideologically, culturally and economically 
motivated, frustrated by both the political failures of the national government and the mass 
unemployment levels that soared across the nation. Mosley attempted to capture the interest 
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of almost every community, supporting local aggravations proved effective, but not effective 
enough to influence political concern. 
Mosley had limited, if any political success, he demonstrated cultural progression, women 
had leading roles within the political movement, it gave many women a platform and a 
political identity.51 Fascism offered women roles beyond canvassing and fund-raising, 
women undertook a full range of activism, from district leaders to ju-jitsu trained stewards.52 
Mosley created a ‘fascist culture’, a fashion to some degree, yet this wasn’t not enough to 
challenge to the party system and break voters’ faith in democracy.53  
Local municipal election results reveal the BUF made progress within these regions, yet 
failed to mount a significant challenge to mainstream political parties, even at the worst 
moments of 1930s depression. The thesis will analyse the regional events surrounding anti-
Semitic behaviour and the effects it had on anti-fascist support, racist populism drove more 
resistance than it did support. The strength in opposition led to greater state control, which 
eventually suppressed the party and its leaders into submission. The thesis will demonstrate 
to what extent the BUF made progress in the three most prominent localities across Britain 
and whether it was a threat to local or national politics.  
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Chapter Two – Fascism in Yorkshire 
Fascist doctrines were by no means unfamiliar to the inhabitants of Yorkshire in the 1920s. 
The citizens of Yorkshire had been aware of earlier Fascist groups such as the Imperial 
Fascist League. Like Mosley’s BUF it failed to mobilise popular support for their cause. A 
few expressed interest into notions of Fascism in Yorkshire, yet they were never collectively 
committed enough to cause a major concern. The Yorkshire members of the BUF associated 
with the movement for several reasons ranging from industrial suffering to young progressive 
conservatives experimenting with ideologies further along the political spectrum. However, 
whilst present in Yorkshire fascism had very little influence in its political life, failing to elect 
any members of parliament and all attempts to breakthrough local municipal elections failed 
emphatically.  
Mosley expressed an interest in Yorkshire through his public speaking visits with the New 
Party.54 During these visits, Mosley recognised the industrial issues that plagued the local 
towns and cities of Yorkshire and began to shape his policies around the areas of 
vulnerability. Indeed, Leeds was one of the first cities to be visited by Mosley and the New 
Party in 1931.55 The New Party formed around Mosley’s memorandum, a document that 
advocated reducing unemployment through tariff protection, public works schemes and 
protection of local industries. All of which resonated with the struggles found in Yorkshire.  
W. J. Leaper, the New Party candidate for Shipley in 1931 who later became a prominent 
writer in the Fascist National Press, suggested many of the New Party supporters remained 
loyal to Oswald Mosley in cities such as Leeds, even after the New Party’s national landslide 
electoral defeat in 1931.56 After battling with the failure to make any progress through the 
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traditional diplomatic means within the New Party, Mosley drove forward his ideas of an 
economic renaissance with the formation of the British Union of Fascists in October 1932.57  
Designed to act and address the economic suffering of the nation, Mosley began to campaign 
across towns and cities like Leeds, Bradford, Huddersfield and Sheffield to only name a few.  
Leeds was not unaware of far-right political notions. The Imperial Fascist League had a 
strong branch of support in both Leeds and Bradford.58 Evidence has also been identified that 
there was a following of ‘The Liberators Group’, a racist outfit similar to the Ku Klux Klan 
that operated specifically against Jews.59 Anti-Semitic roots were ingrained into the 
foundations of some of Yorkshire’s cities, yet anti-Semitism barely featured as part of the 
pre-1934 Fascist agenda. It was however, used intrusively between 1934 and 1937, despite 
Mosley’s denial. Mosley aimed to identify the movement with local issues. To achieve local 
support Mosley needed to dress the national fascist agenda in an outfit of local causes. In 
Yorkshire, Mosley succeeded in targeting the domestic issues of each region, painting a 
picture of distress with Fascism as the only alternative solution to the country's ills.  
The membership of the British Union of Fascists was estimated to have been around 50,000 
in its pinnacle year of 1934.60 This figure was hugely influenced by Lord Rothermere, a 
financier of the party who wrote about the advantages of Mosley’s party in the Daily Mail. 
To measure the threat, in the same year, the Labour Party released a national survey to its 
constituents to monitor the progress of Fascism within the local community. The survey 
questioned whether public meetings were held, how often the members frequented, how the 
local press reported the demonstrations, if any literature is being distributed and if there was 
any resistance activity by other political parties. The survey demonstrates the progression of 
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the BUF in 1934, when membership expanded at rates that evidently concerned opposing 
parties.  
The Labour survey returned a wave of responses in Yorkshire. In the returned questionnaire 
for Sheffield, it stated that there were approximately 350 members of the BUF, 50 of whom 
wore uniform. The survey comments on how regular outdoor meetings occurred in Sheffield, 
yet this wasn’t supported by press coverage.61  
In Wakefield the secretary, A. B. Johnson, raised concerns with the behaviour of the British 
Union of Fascists. He used the questionnaire to report back that Wakefield is to be the central 
branch of Fascism for the West Riding. He went on to further recommend, after witnessing a 
public meeting held in Wakefield hall that occupied a full room of 200 attendees, to let the 
police be responsible for maintaining order as opposed to the stewards.62 This would be a 
condition of the let from the co-op, a property target of the BUF’s.  
The national Labour survey helps in understanding the patterns of movement within the 
Fascist community, many members of whom travelled between the industrial towns to show 
their support for the public speeches. The secretary of Leeds suggests that most attendees of 
the Mosley Leeds town hall meeting in June 1934, travelled to Leeds from neighbouring 
towns and cities by bus.63 This undermined the strength of the movement, as it demonstrates 
a rather limited reach in its armour of support at a time where membership was thought to be 
at its pinnacle.  
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In Harrogate, in a cover letter sent to secretary J. S. Middleton of Transport House, Labour 
Party Head Office on 20 June 1934, the constituent expresses concern with the rate of 
recruitment amongst the young affluent individuals in its locality. 
In expressing my own personal opinion, I should be inclined to say that the 
BUF is making considerable progress in and around Harrogate, and that their 
membership is being recruited very largely from the young people of the 
‘well to do class’ of whom there are a considerable number in Harrogate.64 
The BUF made progress in connecting with the younger conservative voters in Harrogate. 
Mosley’s policies had imperial unity ingrained into them, they thought it was a necessity to 
restore imperial values into the nation, so Britain could share a voice in the world stage. Not 
only did the BUF resonate with local working-class causes like that of the woollen trades of 
Leeds, but also with the middle-class nationalists who were politically aligned with the 
imperial ideology advocated by Mosley.  
It can be inferred from the Labour survey that a different recruitment approach was 
underway, the local fascist organisation adopted different tactics to those offered in industrial 
towns. ‘At their meetings they invite contribution and appeal to questions, and they appear to 
be gaining considerable ground in this area.’65 Mosley was adaptable in his approach and 
sought to give the under-represented a voice in politics. He attracted youthful members of all 
genders by offering opportunities to socialise with likeminded individuals. He promoted 
sports like boxing and fencing and created clubs for people to train. 
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The impact of such tactics shows little significance in terms of membership numbers. Whilst 
the Labour survey does show Fascist activity across the Yorkshire towns, it doesn’t 
demonstrate an influential movement close to occupying a national threat. The movement did 
seem to be building on a bed of indefinable classes. In Harrogate, the younger Tories were 
expressing interest in Mosley.66 A deeper look into the Mosley’s speeches and recruitment 
methods suggests that the BUF targeted all classes. The loyalty and commitment of the 
members was then put under strain after the BUF continued to express militant tactics at 
public demonstrations. The events at the 1934 Olympia rally shocked the nation. The BUF 
brutally assaulted several anti-fascist protesters, resulting in the police intervening  
The consequences of Olympia meeting resulted in a substantial decline in membership 
figures across the nation, including those in Yorkshire. Olympia influenced the politically 
indecisive to disassociate with a barbaric political party. Through the withdrawal of Lord 
Rothermere, many of the members who came forth on the back of the Daily Mail’s national 
newspaper campaign, abandoned the movement for the public’s perception of the BUF 
shifted almost overnight. The losses sustained included the ‘well to do classes’ from 
Harrogate.67 This subsequently led to a membership of hardened and loyal fascists, people 
who supported the Fascist movement for action and change.  
Mosley recognised that a new direction was required to increase membership figures. After 
showing anti-Semitic behaviour throughout his campaign, after 1936 he publicly became 
anti-Jewish and actively demonstrated his frustration with the Jewish population in his public 
meetings. Mosley sought to scapegoat the Jewish population for society’s struggles by 
interlinking anti-Semitism with local grievances. Indeed, he argued in a speech in Bradford, 
that ‘The reduction of the value of the German market was, he declared, almost entirely due 
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to the Jewish International boycotting of German goods.’68 Similarly, in a speech delivered in 
Leeds in 1937, the Jews were accused of strangling the British woollen trades. ‘We will not 
tolerate great Jewish combines establishing a stranglehold on the British woollen and 
furniture trades.’69 In Barnsley, William Joyce targeted the struggling mining communities. 
He stressed the importance of the mines to the extraction of petroleum from coal, reassuring 
the importance of their production.70  
There is no evidence to suggest the local agricultural and county textile campaigns led to a 
substantial increase in Fascist support in Yorkshire. Whilst it can be assumed that it drew the 
attention of the local crowds, it cannot be considered as the most significant contributor. Yet, 
one consistency ran through all state-theory and propaganda programmes post 1934, anti-
Semitism. Mosley’s speeches amplified his disposition to the Jewish race; manipulating 
social frictions for political gains.71  
Table A, Jewish Population in Yorkshire, Jewish Yearbook 193672 
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Town Jewish Population Total Population % Of Jews 
% As compared 
with other 
Yorkshire cities   
Leeds 25,000 458,320 5.49% 1st  
Hull 2,500 287,013 0.87% 12th  
Middlesbrough 700 131,103 0.53% 22nd  
Sheffield 2,462 490,724 0.50% 23rd  
Bradford 750 285,979 0.26% Not known 
York 60 82,282 0.07% Not known 
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The Jewish community in Leeds occupied the highest percentage of population for any city in 
the country, which made it a centre of anti-Semitism in Yorkshire. The Jewish population in 
1936 in both Leeds and East London was growing at considerable rates as displayed in this 
table above – with the Jewish population in Leeds occupying 5.49% of the total population.  
Anti-Semitic tensions grew in parallel to the Jewish population growth; Basil Henrique aptly 
defining the Fascist stance in a speech in Leeds 1937. 
We in London and you in Leeds have, during the last six or seven months 
have been insulted by something, which I consider to be completely un-
English.73 
Henrique’s speech was posted in the Jewish Chronicle, a newspaper that circulated 
nationwide and condemned the actions of the Fascists.74 The paper summarised the hostility 
the BUF had created amongst the Jewish community.  
Further tension was evidenced when the Yorkshire Post posted headlines in respect to 
conditions in Hull entitled, ‘Fear of riots in Hull’.75 Anti-Semitic posters and flyers became 
commonplace around Yorkshire cities and poison-pen letters were being sent to anti-fascists 
and Jews.76 
Elsewhere, Mosley had vowed to tackle the Jewish opposition that was forming after 
Olympia. At Leicester in April 1935 Mosley declared: 
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For the first time, I openly and publicly challenge the Jewish interest in 
this country commanding commerce, commanding the press, 
commanding the cinema, dominating the City of London, killing industry 
with sweatshops. These great interests are not intimidating, and will not 
intimidate, the Fascist movement of the modern age.77  
Mosley declared war against the Jewish population that had been so forcefully opposing him 
at his meetings. He targeted the ‘old gangs’ that had formed under Jewish monopolies. In 
one example the BUF identified themselves with the underrepresented nations shopkeepers – 
an obvious opportunity for a party with a declining membership. The Shops (Sunday 
Trading Restriction) Act of 1936 restricted the number of days a shop could trade. 
According to Mosley, this restriction imposed on the local trader, played into the hands of 
the Jewish corporations and victimised private traders. A BUF political pamphlet written in 
1939 suggests that a crisis was developing for local enterprise.  
The alarming growth of the chain store, multiple shop and cut-price 
monopolies is rapidly provoking a crisis amongst the distributive trades. 
The small shopkeeper is being driven off the streets of this country before 
the inexorable advance of the great trusts and combines, so many of 
which are controlled by alien and Jewish finance.78 
The government failed to consider the impact of passing the bill for the local trader, leaving 
the topic open for Mosley to oppose government policy and attempt to identify with the 
shopkeepers and their trading partners. In the second reading of the bill in the House of 
Lords, the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava comments of consumer behaviour, 'It is totally 
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unnecessary from the consumer’s point of view that these shops be open on Sunday, and 
totally unnecessary from the shop-keeper’s point of view, because, after all, one does not 
increase the volume of trade by opening on Sunday, one merely spreads it over a longer 
period.'79  
Mosley used this opportunity to identify his cause with the local movement of shopkeepers. 
He commented further by suggesting it was 'dire necessity to open on Sundays. It was stark 
tyranny that deprived him of this last means of livelihood.'80 Mosley pledged to support the 
nation of shopkeepers by opposing the bill, later calling for the shopkeepers to unite by 
signing up to the British Union. There is little evidence to suggest this increased the 
membership figures for the BUF, requests for amendments to this bill were somewhat 
frequent and often rejected. 
Similar tactics were used by the BUF across a variety of trades. There is little evidence to 
suggest that this tactic influenced an increase in support, yet it did bring about greater 
awareness of what Mosley stood for as he leveraged wider issues to identify Fascism as a 
resolution to all of society's ills. Mosley also used this opportunity to attack the Jewish 
combines and enforce his policy of Occupational Franchise, which aimed to grant direct 
Parliament representation for local industries by creating a diplomatic means for members to 
vote on matters concerning their respective trades. Such a policy would invoke action within 
politics rather than the slow-moving pace of traditional parliament and remove the weight 
and influence the powerful Jewish corporations had over industrial policy. This is just one 
example of how Mosley positioned his party in parliamentary disputes to gather momentum 
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for his cause. When the opportunity arose for him to side with a local or national issue, 
Mosley took his position in hope of identifying with as many groups as possible.  
The greatest influence on Fascist membership growth after 1934 was clearly the BUF’s 
identification with anti-Semitism. East London held the largest Jewish community in the 
whole of the United Kingdom with Leeds coming second. The Jewish population became a 
scapegoat for the attacks on the BUF at Olympia. Mosley re-positioned his political agenda 
after Olympia 1934 despite the loss of Lord Rothermere. To re-ignite his following, Mosley 
aimed to scapegoat the Jewish community using anti-Semitism as a cynical weapon of 
political mobilisation. The economic crisis paved a way for anti-Semitic ideologies, a wave 
of racial elitist notions became the feature of Mosley’s public speeches, propelling the BUF 
into further confrontation.81  
Skidelsky describes the Jewish anti-fascist disruptions of Mosley’s meetings as a pre-emptive 
strike that sought to strangle the BUF at birth.82 Controversially, Skidelsky excuses the anti-
Semitic behaviour as retaliation to the offence the Jewish embarked on during Fascist party 
meetings. He argued that anti-Semitism was spawned out of retaliation to the behaviour of 
the anti-fascist Jews. To suggest anti-Semitism was a reaction to the Jewish response to 
fascism undermines the multiple examples of anti-Jewry demonstrated by fascists before 
1936. Daniel Tille’s argues that the Jewish response to Fascism began with the New Party, 
where it constantly monitored its activity, evidence to support this can be found in the Jewish 
Chronicle in the early 1930s.83  
In Yorkshire, the rapid growth of the BUF preceded the local agitation with the Jews. Anti-
Semitism was Mosley’s last attempt to drum up discontent within areas of high Jewish 
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settlement. At the height of the anti-Semitic movement in 1936-7, the BUF’s membership in 
Yorkshire was in steep decline.84 Provocative campaigns in Yorkshire only led to an increase 
in anti-fascist resistance. A BUF march to Holbeck Moor in Leeds in September 1936, 
resulted in a clash with 20,000 anti-fascist demonstrators in which Mosley and many other 
fascists were injured by missiles.85  
By maligning the anti-fascists, the BUF could attract a more respectable member, those who 
they labelled as patriotic, law-abiding and honest. The movement had now filtered out the 
cosmopolitan followers who desired only the social elements of the membership and perhaps 
the idyllic uniform. The youthful followers lost momentum due to the BUF’s pacifist stance. 
This paved a new opening for the BUF, yet they failed to impose any threat in numbers.  
Indeed, the Public Order Act of 1936 increased the power of the authorities and limited civil 
liberties. The movement became less desirable, particularly with the Spanish Civil War 
influencing a rise in Republicanism and European Fascism looking a greater threat to world 
peace.  
Anti-Semitic demonstrations were Mosley’s last-ditch attempts to revive the membership of 
the BUF. Anti-Jewish notions dominated the post-1934 recruitment drive for the BUF and it 
sparked considerable interest in middle-class areas in Yorkshire. Mosley drafted an anti-
Semitic theme into his national policies that appealed to the working-classes.  
Mosley was keen to capitalise on the suffering farming communities that had endured 
intractable economic problems since the end of the war. A decade of plummeting prices had 
driven many bankruptcies and the sale of cheap land within Yorkshire’s farming community. 
The price of wheat had dropped by 50 per cent between the year of 1929-1931 and that of 
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beef by 30 per cent the same year, resulting in cultivation declining to levels of redundancy.86  
Consequently, Mosley attracted large enthusiastic audiences in agricultural towns and cities 
like York, where he won over important activists through his agricultural policy.87 The 
agricultural policy was marketed to local working-class farmers whilst criticising the Jewish 
financiers that encouraged international imports. His policy decreed to expand its domestic 
agricultural market by £200 million – exactly the value of imported food. This would be 
achieved through a three-year plan that incorporated an agricultural bank lending to its 
farmers to effectively meet their targets when corporate planning.88 
Mosley strengthened his argument by implanting fear and distress in Yorkshire. Releasing 
headlines in the Blackshirt warning people of the doom the woollen industries faced under 
the Tory government. ‘Without a constructive plan, such as the British Union proposes the 
woollen industry of Yorkshire is inevitably doomed.’89 He then went on to advertise a 
scheduled campaign to target the local regions within Yorkshire. 
A campaign to bring before the textile workers of Yorkshire the British 
Union’s constructive policy for the woollen industry will be held from 
Feb 27 to March 12. Towns to be covered are Leeds, Bradford, Halifax, 
Huddersfield, Dewsbury, Shipley, Batley, Keighley, Pudsey, 
Cleckheaton, Bingley and Morley.90 
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One can infer from the absence of further reference to it in subsequent editions of the 
Blackshirt, that this campaign produced little response and no substantial increase in support. 
Had it been otherwise, the Fascist propagandists would not have ignored it.  
During 1935 the BUF began to re-adjust its structure. Mosley adopted a policy of ‘Fascist 
next time’ and encouraged his followers to withhold their vote in the coming general 
election in protest against parliament. New BUF branches were formed and existing ones 
extended their capability to cover as many parliamentary constituencies as possible.91 In 
Leeds, five of the six parliamentary consistencies had Fascist branches in 1935. Growth also 
appeared in Sheffield, where four branches emerged, and in Bradford and Hull where three 
branches were formed. Many more towns including Barnsley, Pudsey, Otley, Featherstone 
and Halifax all saw Fascist branches emerge between 1935 and 1936.92 The restructure was 
a response to 1934 membership influx, Mosley soon realised that if he was to put forward 
Fascist MP’s, a reliable infrastructure needed to be in place to support them. 
In November 1936, the BUF headquarters in London announced the first one hundred 
constituencies that they intended to fight in the next general election, twelve of which were 
from Yorkshire. 93  The British Union of Fascists chose constituencies in Bradford, Leeds, 
Hull, Huddersfield and Sheffield. These were areas as the 1936 Jewish Yearbook suggests, 
with the highest Jewish population, but also areas of strong Fascist support.  
Leeds held the highest population of Jews, totalling roughly 25,000, with 2,500 at Hull 2,462 
in Sheffield and 750 in Bradford.94 The BUF knew if they stood a chance of gathering any 
measure of success they needed to target habitats that could be manipulated by the BUF’s 
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right-wing nature. That’s not to suggest these areas were one of political instability, rather 
these areas like the rest of the nation were suffering from the economic depression, seeking 
to find a solution within the political system.  
The chosen constituencies were areas that would likely generate a strong Fascist 
representation in the polls. The Labour Party dominated the local elections in Leeds95 which 
was considered the Fascist stronghold in Yorkshire, where it occupied 2,000 members at its 
height in 1934. In Sheffield the Fascist movement is said to have been around 350 strong. 
The secretary of Sheffield Trade and Labour Council commented in the Labour survey that 
regular outdoor meetings took place; propaganda was distributed, thought it was met with 
little resistance.96 Only a handful of complaints about the activity had been submitted to the 
council, this could have been a consequence of the low Jewish population (0.5 per cent of 
the total population, 2.4k, vs 490k) as well as an economy on a path to recovery. The 
movement did not gather a significant following in Sheffield, it was tolerated as opposed to 
supported, resulting in little press coverage. Without opposition to thrive off, the BUF failed 
to gather support and publicity. Mosley’s manifesto vowed to revive the economy by solving 
local economic issues and lifting the hand of the Jewish elite from exercising what he felt 
was excessive power over the country, yet in Sheffield the Jewish population was a minority 
and the economy was on the road to recovery. Consequently, Mosley’s hand was becoming 
less relevant to the people of Sheffield. 
The Blackshirt comments on the consequences of the economy in 1938.  
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The prosperity bubble has now completely exploded in Yorkshire… in 
places like Barnsley, Doncaster, Middlesbrough and Hull, British Union 
propaganda is not the battle it was some time ago.97 
The economic suffering of the 1930s had just as much of an effect on the BUF internally 
than it had on the wider public. Membership was plummeting by the time the election of 
November 1937 came around. The BUF faced almost complete financial disaster. 
Expenditure cuts meant that nearly all the paid BUF staff had to be cut. A total of 101 out of 
140 staff was dismissed; this included all the subordinate full-time organisers and 
propagandists.98 The expenditure cuts saw the BUF turn into relative turmoil, specifically in 
the North of England. The director of propaganda, William Joyce and the editor of Action, 
John Beckett took badly to their dismissal. Joyce managed to raise funding from a former 
British Union financier to create the ‘National Socialist League’.99 The financial crisis had a 
damning effect on the branches of Yorkshire, resulting in declining public support and 
northern branches with very little funding.   
Mosley needed to use the opportunity of the Metropolitan Borough Council elections to 
drum up support for the failing BUF. This proved highly difficult with little to no campaign 
funding. The election results that prevailed showed a discouraging position for the British 
Union of Fascists for no gains were achieved.100   
Fascism, though making little headway in Yorkshire, was still trying to capture support 
through the industrial failures of Yorkshire industry. Indeed, in a political pamphlet entitled, 
Yorkshire Betrayed in 1939, Mosley effectively contrasted the suffering of Yorkshire’s 
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woollen trade with the BUF’s political agenda.101 One of the areas of substance in the 
pamphlet discussed the need for Britain to distance herself from the international trading 
market. Rather than openly competing against international free trade, Mosley advocated an 
insulated empire policy, whereby Yorkshire would have secure export markets within its 
empirical confines. This guarantee would subsequently see a tax levy on non-empirical 
goods, making them more expensive within the countries of Britain’s Empire – an economic 
policy similar to that of America’s throughout the 1920s that saw import tariffs placed on US 
goods sold in Europe. Mosley’s link to Yorkshire’s local trade issues was part of his wider 
economic scheme discussed in his earlier book, The Greater Britain of 1932, a cogent 
document that offered a far more considered approach to Fascism than any of his continental 
counterparts.102  
Mosley initiated his policy of ‘industrial self-government’ arguing what a self-governing 
industry is supposed to regulate itself using the representative bodies it is built on, the 
workers, the manufacturers, the consumers and the shippers. Mosley took this opportunity to 
target all the members of the woollen trade by stating it would retain in the hands of the 
Yorkshire people. Small enterprise would be able to stand up to the ever-looming threat of 
Jewish combine trusts, thus restoring fair competition on the ground of British commercial 
morality. 
In the closing statement of the 1939 Yorkshire Betrayed pamphlet, Mosley advocated to 
defend Yorkshire by outlining two immediate benefits his policy would have on the Woollen 
industry. 
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1. Because the increased purchasing power resulting from higher protected rates 
within the corporations will bring immediate increased demand for clothing in the 
domestic market. 
2. Because the organised state will be able to bring bargaining power to bear upon 
those countries which sell us raw materials, demanding that they buy our 
manufactured articles in return, and thus supporting our export trade.103 
Mosley further attacked the Jewish population with his economic policies by suggesting the 
industries were built on Jewish monopolies who aimed to squeeze competition out of local 
business. Mosley also targeted Jews during his election campaigns and through public 
speeches. In March 1940, a Fascist candidate stood in the North-East Leeds by-election. Anti-
Semitic discontent influenced his support and shaped his campaign – so much so that the 
Yorkshire Evening News reported, 
Voters going to the poll saw vehement anti-Jewish posters displayed on 
walls… walls and pavement in the district were defaced with anti-Jewish 
slogans.104 
Further evidence for anti-Semitic behaviour derives directly from the former director of 
propaganda, Richard Bellamy. In his Authorised History of the British Union of Fascists, 
describes William Joyce’s anti-Semitism as harmful to the BUF after a middle-aged 
Yorkshireman commented at an outdoor meeting in Leeds: 'I had come here especially to 
hear what your party thought it could do to help the wool trade but all I have had to listen to 
is a lot of silly crap-trap about Jews'.105 This suggests that the movement appealed to the 
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working class concerned with their local industry. The BUF had let their opposition with the 
Jewish population overbear the real economic solutions it aimed to provide.  
Nevertheless, membership of the BUF rose again in 1938 after suffering considerably since 
its pinnacle in 1934. Membership figures ran relatively thin after the autumn of 1935 and 
little activity occurred in Yorkshire.  The Public Order Act of 1936 had prohibited the 
movement from wearing a parliamentary uniform in public, estranging the younger members 
of Leeds, subsequently leaving a solid and dedicated core of members. The Blackshirt 
mentioned little activity in places like Leeds and Harrogate in the years after 1934.106  
As the decade progressed and war approached, Fascist activity became infrequent. The 
apparent apathetic attitude of the local branches is shown through the organisation of the 
Fascists biggest ever-indoor meeting in Yorkshire, 16 July 1939. The meeting was organised 
to demonstrate the public support shown for Mosley’s campaign for appeasement with 
Hitler. 
The purpose of Mosley’s position with appeasement was twofold, he understood public 
opinion and what the prospect of war meant for his political progress, yet more significantly 
he sympathised with Germany and their need to regain economic stability. Mosley 
advocated isolationist policies; aspiring for a self-sufficient economy that relied only on 
imperial trade. If Britain regained such control of its economy and adopted imperial values, 
then and only then, could it resume its foothold within the world council. Yet, Mosley’s 
success relied heavily on the outcome of Hitler’s plan after the provisions of the Treaty of 
Versailles had been lifted, as Hitler’s threat to peace grew, the actions of the state became 
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increasingly forceful and the BUF’s political future shrank both locally in Yorkshire and 
nationally.  
Fascist activity declined across the county. In Leeds, the branch still functioned, although 
many fled in fear of becoming arrested. The mobilisation of the state had proved highly 
effective in its quest to suppress Fascist activity. The Leeds City Police had a special officer 
attending every Fascist meeting and an inside informant. The sufficient monitoring 
eventually led to the arrests of all the major Yorkshire fascist members. 107 
Mosley was pragmatic in his approach to identify with the public. By identifying local issues 
with Fascism, he received an engaged response in Yorkshire. Nevertheless, Fascism failed to 
gather sufficient momentum to ever pose a substantial threat to Yorkshire. The meetings 
were suppressed by the elements that made them thrive. Anti-fascist resistance proved fatal 
for Mosley’s BUF, as it forced the hand of the state to pass the Public Order Act. His 
militant approach had little success in a strong democratic state. Democracy was not about to 
fall under the BUF’s regime; firstly, because Mosley was not well enough mobilised and 
secondly because the state was powerful, despite the economic hardship it endured. The 
Equal Franchises Act entitled the British public to suffrage on equal terms in 1928; 
something the British public were not going to put under threat with Mosley’s proposal to 
dictate under a cabinet of five.  
To analyse the BUF’s failures in Yorkshire assumes that the party was a political threat. The 
BUF never came close enough to political success to analyse its failures. The BUF failed to 
shift public opinion despite their various attempts to connect with the electorate. The 
response to the Labour Party Survey in Yorkshire didn’t demonstrate a movement with 
overwhelming momentum, it showed high volumes of meeting activity with low attendance 
                                                        
107 Trevelyan Scholarship Report, The British Union of Fascists in Yorkshire 1934-40, p. 19. 
45 
 
figures, which offered little insight into the size and scale of the movement. The mainstream 
political parties were conscious of the BUF’s efforts, the need for the Labour Party Survey 
itself demonstrates their concern.  
The BUF made no progress in the local elections. Any reasonable local support for the BUF 
was countered with an equal gathering of resistance. In Leeds and Sheffield there were 
reports in the Yorkshire Post that the ‘Youth fronts against War and Fascism’ had formed.108 
In Bradford, an anti-fascist committee was formed.109 Violence was commonplace at Fascist 
meetings though this was of course exaggerated by the Blackshirt to vilify the anti-fascist 
opposition. Yet there is no evidence to suggest this led to an increase in BUF membership in 
Yorkshire, instead the movement remained insignificant and offered no challenge to local 
elections. 
The BUF electoral failures were a consequence of being too focused on alienating the Jewish 
population. The political reform it campaigned for became diluted by the notion of anti-
Semitism. To engage with the middle-class supporters, rather than aiming to resolve the 
local industrial issues with honest political reform, the BUF focused on immersing itself in 
anti-Semitism. Consequently, the movement gathered a collection of members that was not 
necessarily devoted to the wider Fascist cause, but rather because some elements of the 
BUF’s policies and culture appealed to their political conscious.  
This sense of disunity must be recognised as the greatest challenge for the British Union of 
Fascists. The party membership remained unstable throughout its duration primarily because 
of the variations in the type of Yorkshire members and why they identified with the party, 
some seeing the movement as an economic solution and others wanting to be involved in the 
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social elements around the BUF. Mosley attempted to build a party that appealed to all. 
Whether this was because of local issues Mosley addressed, anti-Semitic unrest or whether it 
was for the cultural and fashionable elements of the movement that was attractive, he 
exercised many tactics to broaden his reach. All failed to unify the movement, resulting in 
the BUF never imposing any threat to the mainstream parties that occupied Yorkshire’s 
electorate.  
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Chapter Three – Fascism in Lancashire 
Lancashire became a hotspot for fascism during the 1930s, housing its northern headquarters 
and maintaining a political party structure that went on to challenge in local elections. 
Similarly, to other prominent Fascist areas in Britain, it became the host to hundreds of 
fascist public displays throughout the 1930s, resulting in the movement gathering a 
prominent local following.  Nevertheless, even here Mosley and the BUF were unable to 
make much of an impression on the existing political balance of power 
Many areas of Lancashire, such as Manchester were unsettled by poor economic conditions, 
declining local trade and a high Jewish population. The declining trades and economic 
concerns of the region played a significant role in influencing a rise in Fascist membership, 
the BUF like in other areas of the country, sought to identify with local aggravations to 
invoke support for the party. The BUF pushed social and gender boundaries by recruiting and 
supporting women in politics, they gave opportunities to younger activists and created a 
fashion-like appeal to their political campaign. Despite their efforts, the BUF failed to mount 
a challenge to the political infrastructure of the interwar governments. 
To understand why Fascism was prominent in Lancashire we must first understand how 
fertile the Lancashire environment was prior to the BUF’s arrival. In Manchester, two Fascist 
parties already existed in isolation of one another. Similarly, to the layout of Yorkshire, a 
group named the British Fascists formed a branch in Manchester in 1923.110 The president for 
the movement was Brigadier-General R. B. D Blakeney, who visited Manchester on 16 
December 1925 to deliver a speech at Albert Square. The speech was received by a small 
crowd, half of whom were reported by the Manchester Guardian as hecklers associated with 
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the Communist party.111 The movement gathered very little momentum and chose to distance 
itself with the other Fascist movements in the area.  
The Fascist Brigade was also formed in the 1920s. This movement was a social gathering that 
replicated the fascist culture of Italy. Designed to retain the political identity and beliefs of 
Mussolini, the Fascist Brigade was set up and was founded by prominent Catholics known as  
‘Della Primara’ (the first hour).112 Dr Laetre Azzoni, one of the founding members influenced 
the spread of the movement to other Italian communities in Leeds, Bradford and Sheffield. 
Yet the movement never looked beyond its isolated Italian spheres. It served as a social 
commune for the children where it retained the characteristics of the ‘motherland’. The 
Fascist Brigade was a cultural movement rather than a political one. It aimed only to 
strengthen its ties to contemporary Italy, rather than aim to spread its ideology to the people 
of Manchester.   
The Fascist Brigade movement in Manchester remained isolated to the events of the British 
Union of Fascists and chose to remain detached from the development of British Fascism. 
The BUF attracted much of their target audience from the Irish Catholic communities and the 
former British Fascists.113 Anti-Semitism was evident in some communities, specifically the 
Irish Catholic groups who were noted for attacking Jews at Cheetham Hill.114 The fact that 
Manchester was home to two Fascist groups prior to 1931, suggests Mosley’s New Party was 
destined to have a strong following. Yet the relationship between the existing Fascist groups 
and the New Party were somewhat tenuous, the same conclusion can be drawn from the pre-
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1931 Fascist parties in Yorkshire towns and cities too. The BUF’s precursor, the New Party 
had declined as quickly as it had risen.115  
The Northern Command Headquarters of the BUF was seated in Preston for the early years of 
the movement. It was headed by G.G. Vincent and assisted by Vincent Keens. The success of 
the local movement depended on the local leaders. It was up to Vincent and Keens to expand 
the movement to a rate where it could maintain a branch that could appoint its own officials. 
It was reported that the movement was fraught with the limitations like that of the New Party. 
Vincent and Keens led with a dictatorial style, with no room for dissent or appeals to higher 
order.116 
The Fascist following in Lancashire was the largest in the whole of the North of England. It 
built its membership on the consequences of Lancashire’s economic struggle throughout the 
early years of the 1930s. Jobs were limited, the cotton industry was in considerable decline 
and the government offered no long-term solutions to the issues. Whether one was a 
businessman or a weaver, for some, fascism began to voice a stake in providing a resolution 
to the country’s ills. Nellie Driver, the Woman’s District Leader of Nelson, subscribes to the 
belief that the movement attracted a membership of all classes.  
The rank and file of the members came from all walks of life, from 
Dockers to doctors; miners to office workers; and factory workers to big 
business men. When on active duty they all wore the same uniform, so that 
there was no class distinction, and all had the same chance of gaining rank. 
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If a lad of eighteen was capable of being district leader, he was the one 
appointed.117 
The BUF aimed to gather momentum by initially breaking through to the cotton workers. 
Throughout the 1930s, staple industries suffered due to foreign competition. Loom 
production was falling at substantial rates, from 1917 to 1937; the industry produced 43 per 
cent less cotton. This had a detrimental effect on the security of the weavers’ jobs, with 
267,000 male and females losing their positions within the mills between the years of 1912 to 
1937.118 
The BUF made it clear the reason for such a collapse within the cotton industry; Britain had 
lost 23.5 million spindles of cotton between the years of 1912 to 1937.119 The loss derived 
from foreign competition, specifically that of China, Japan and the African colonies.  
The BUF firmly sided with the vulnerable cotton workers. The BUF wanted to restrict trade 
and specifically prevent the erection of cotton mills in Japan and China, built by British 
financiers, namely the Jewish Sassoon family. Lancashire was being outpriced in the 
production and sale of cotton to British colonies like India. A quote from a BUF pamphlet on 
Lancashire reads, ‘The main reason for Japan’s lower prices is that her labour costs on 
comparable cloths appear to be less than a fifth of Lancashire’s’.120 Production output was 
also considerably higher in Japan for they bypassed regulations set out under the Factories 
Act, as evidenced by Captain Fuller when addressing the house in 1933. 
Apart from the factories in Japan, there is a very large cottage industry, 
where factory legislation does not apply and hours of work are longer and 
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wages lower, and this is especially the case in the country districts where 
goods are made for export to those markets we formerly enjoyed, 
including Empire markets. I think this explains why Japanese looms have 
a greater output, especially when we remember that in this country our 
looms work one shift per day approximately 48 hours per week, while in 
Japan not less than two shifts per day and 120 hours per week are 
worked.121 
The topic of Japan and her cotton production was frequently debated in the House of Lords. 
In the one debate on this issue on 29 November 1933, Captain Fuller, a former major general 
turned BUF member in 1934, addressed the house to call for a vigorous motion in dealing 
with the crisis that the Cotton industry faced in this period.122 On the one hand, many 
traditionalists were in favour of isolating Japan’s trade by sanctioning their ability to trade 
within Britain’s Empire. On the other hand, the motion was opposed by many who sought to 
criticise the self-destructing industry, dubbed as the product of a greedy capitalist state. Mr 
Crossley, the MP for Oldham decreed the Cotton industry was full of undercutting jealousies, 
who 'given the opportunity to ‘undercut’ the Japanese capitalists, would do it'.123 The home 
market needed to unify similarly to its approach during the war, to drive a harder bargain 
within the foreign marketplace.  
Mosley’s influence on the cotton campaign extended beyond Lancashire, it influenced the 
electorate’s position on Indian Reform.124 Mosley brought attention to the topic of Indian 
Reform to the working class cotton employees, by advocating Britain ruled India by 
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conquest, dismissing the case to enfranchise ‘thirty million illiterates’ and opposing handing 
over power to the pockets of financiers.125 Mosley wanted to develop the Empire into a 
source of food and raw materials and influence economic growth at home, instead of 
‘fattening profits’ at the expense of British producers.126 
The BUF advocated an ‘Insulated Empire’ policy to combat the ills of the woollen industry. 
The policy suggested the exclusion of foreign goods within the Empire’s markets, except 
where an equitable exchange of products had been arranged by the Government. Mosley’s 
position on international cotton trade was influenced by the necessity to stimulate Britain’s 
trade as well as encourage a link between the working class and the Empire, by 
demonstrating the economic benefits of imperial trade. After the consequences of the 
economic decisions of the 1920s, specifically the return to the gold standard and then Lloyd 
George’s deflationary policies, Mosley proposed an outspoken and alternative solution. In a 
BUF pamphlet titled, Is Lancashire Doomed, he suggests a policy of protection for 
Lancashire and Britain’s imperial markets.  
The British Union distinguishes clearly between the function of 
Government and the function of Industry. The protection and 
preservation of imperial markets and the prevention of unfair sweated 
competition in those markets is a part of the duty of Government, a 
duty scandalously neglected by the present so-called ‘National’ 
Government.127  
The British Union of Fascists aimed to denounce the government's reluctance to act and 
exclude all Japanese and other foreign cotton goods from trading with colonial markets. This 
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was thought would inspire a trade recovery in Lancashire, but also in East and Central Africa. 
Mosley aimed to ‘insulate’ Britain and its Empire from potential world economic crisis, like 
that of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. He argued that he did not want to isolate Britain and 
the Empire from mutually beneficial trade. Instead, Mosley and the BUF wanted to leverage 
the Empire to protect British industry and to protect imperial values across the nation through 
demonstrating the economic benefits of the Empire to the working-class voters. By 
strengthening the Empire, they argued Britain could resume their foothold within the world 
stage. 
Mosley later announced in the same pamphlet that once the Cotton Industry has been 
restored, the governance of the industry would be passed over to the National Cotton 
Corporation, a self-governing body built up of every firm, trade unions, shippers and other 
consumers of the industry.128 This notion of a self-governing industry amidst a Fascist 
government seems both idealistic and improbable. Patterns in attendance figures seemed to 
be emerging in the early 1930s, meetings were well attended and the movement began to look 
a threat.  Yet Mosley failed to gather any serious momentum from the cotton community, the 
threat to the national government lay in splitting the vote by appealing to patriotic Tories and 
unsettled, unemployed millworkers, thus providing an opening for the Labour party.129 
Further to this, the BUF undermined itself with militancy and its influence over the violent 
backlash that pursued most meetings. Many turned out to hear Mosley’s economic ideas, but 
the policies in which he voiced were overshadowed by the militant clashes expressed by 
members and anti-fascist demonstrators.  
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Violence at Mosley’s demonstrations hindered the BUF’s electoral progress, but it played 
into the culture he was beginning to develop. Violence at Mosley’s meetings became the 
focal point for the younger members who identified with the movement. The British Union of 
Fascists protected their public meetings with a ring of stewards around the inside of the 
venue. This gave the general feeling that the meetings could at any moment erupt into violent 
disorder.   
The first example of Fascist public display and violent disorder derived from the meeting at 
the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, on 12 March 1933.130 This meeting was the first example of 
Mosley turning his attention away from London. The meeting was dubbed as a mass 
demonstration to exhibit Fascist support in the North of England. The ‘Spring Offensive’ as 
labelled by Mosley, achieved certain notoriety across the nation. It was the first example of 
the ‘Blackshirt’ stewards using weapons to beat down hecklers.  
At the beginning of every meeting, Mosley made it clear his position on anybody who 
attempted to restrict free speech. 
We do not want any fighting or violence. On the other hand we are 
going to have free speech. That is why we are organised to preserve free 
speech and have our defence force here tonight. No one will be 
molested by us providing he gives us a chance to put our case. If anyone 
has come with the object of preventing free speech in Manchester he 
may go out head first.131 
Mosley then proceeded with delivering his speech, detailing his position on industrial 
organisation if he came to power. The opportunity arose for the crowd to ask Mosley 
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questions, one audience member wanted to know whether the union was anti-Semitic. 
Mosley was quick to refute this charge, denying any association with anti-Semitism, which 
given earlier evidence was doubtful. Another member of the audience pursued his answer 
only to find himself dealing with a uniformed steward telling him to be quiet. A Manchester 
Guardian reporter observed the situation and reported the following. 
There was some argument and much disorder, in which Sir Oswald could 
be heard at the press table telling the steward to leave the interrupter 
alone, but he did not hear and continued to dispute, which ended with a 
blow which could be heard at the press table. This plunged the whole of 
the watching audience in tumult. One steward pinioned the interrupter by 
the arms and carried him along the front aisle, sweeping people off the 
front row chairs immediately below the platform. Immediately after an 
indignant Scotsman rushed at the platform loudly calling on Sir Oswald 
to tell him that of the stewards had hit a woman and asking if he allowed 
that. A large part of the audience was booing, and the rest appeared to be 
shouting and screaming, in no part of the hall where their people sitting 
down.  
Sir Oswald stood helpless, with his arms folded, looking at the confusion, 
which increased every minute. The centre gangway was filled with 
people fighting; civilians, grey shirts and black shirts. A row of three 
chairs was lifted in the air. Some men could be seen using what looked 
like rubber truncheons. At the moment it appeared that the hall would 
never be cleared without serious injury.132  
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Mosley eventually decided to terminate the meeting and the police cleared everybody out of 
the hall. The Free Trade Hall meeting marked the first time the BUF used weapons at its 
public meetings, something that became commonplace in the subsequent gatherings. The 
meeting also marked the first-time police intervened at one of the BUF’s meeting, a move 
that exposed the purpose of the ‘stewards’ and gave the BUF a notoriety that haunted their 
potential from ever becoming an established mainstream party. The normal practise of the 
police was not to intervene in private meetings, but on this occasion Chief Constable 
Maxwell felt it was needed. Furthermore, as the meeting was met with many female 
protesters, it marked the turning point for the movement to open itself to all genders. Focus 
was then on placed on inviting women to the movement so they could act as stewards, for a 
male confronting a female protester would have only damaged the reputation of the BUF 
even further. 
Women went on to play a prominent role with the British Union of Fascists. Like anti-
Semitism, the role of the woman grew in parallel from 1932. A national survey conducted by 
the Labour party in 1934 to monitor the British Union of Fascists suggests that in Bolton, 18 
women were actively selling copies of the Blackshirt at all meetings, in the main streets and 
outside the market, an observation made by the Labour party of Bolton.133 Women 
eventually accounted for 25 per cent of the movement’s membership and 28 per cent of 
those who attended movements and marches. Woman served as Blackshirts and stewards, 
sold newspapers, leaflets and helped raise funds. They organised their own Women’s 
Section (1937), which had its own speakers and classes. They initiated their own Women’s 
Propaganda Patrol (1933) as well as their own Para-military Women’s Defence Force (1934) 
                                                        
133 The MPM, LP/ FAS/ 34/ 7, 10 Dec 1934, A response from Bolton Labour party’s survey 
on Fascism. 
57 
 
and Women's Drum Corps (1937).134 The BUF united genders and gave women a platform 
to voice their political beliefs and progress within their party infrastructure.  
Nellie Driver, a former district leader of the fascist movement brings a unique perspective to 
the BUF in Lancashire, her autobiography provides insight into gender opportunities, the type 
of people who were brought into fascism, and the challenges she faced as a district leader. 
Information that the local press, reports of the public meetings and BUF propaganda does not 
otherwise provide.  
By breaking through gender barriers, adopting a uniform, creating social opportunities and 
fuelling a militant approach to demonstrations, Mosley created a unique and fashionable 
movement. Mosley always denied the initiation of violence at his meetings, insisting that the 
Blackshirts were always acting in defence of attacks from the ‘reds’.135  
In The Star libel court case in 1936, Mosley justified the attacks by accusing the ‘reds’ of 
attacking the BUF members with razorblades in the meetings prior to the one at Free Trade 
Hall. No attacks on the BUF were reported prior to the meeting at the Free Trade Hall in any 
of Manchester’s newspapers, something that could not have been ignored by the press. The 
only other suggestion that could be made is if the victims did not report the attacks, again 
something that is highly unlikely as the BUF would have capitalised on any opportunity to 
further their political presence. Mosley also stated in 1936, that ‘the meeting was the only 
occasion where weapons were used by our people’. 
In Rochdale, only two days later, a man was arrested for breaching the peace, assault and 
being armed with a coil of rubber filled with lead. Daniel McNichol, the Lancastrian man in 
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question was later sentenced to three months’ hard labour for his participation in the events 
that unfolded in Rochdale.136 McNichol was involved in further incriminating activity 
throughout 1933; another case reported that McNichol had struck a blow to a Jewish man 
walking down Miller Street for no apparent reason. He was later fined £5 for the offence that 
took place shortly after his stint of hard labour.137 It was disclosed to the court that 
McNichol was involved in the spreading of anti-Semitic propaganda, specifically on the 
premises occupied by Jewish trades people. McNichol’s case presents evidence to suggest 
that the BUF were demonstrating anti-Semitic behaviour as early as 1933. This example, 
albeit an isolated instance in this context, suggests that anti-Semitism ran through the 
foundation of the BUF since its formation. There was evidence for Jew baiting as early as 
1932, yet Mosley always denied the party’s association with anti-Semitism, something that 
the Jewish elite took at face value.  
The BUF never resisted clashes with anti-fascist and communist groups, particularly in 
Manchester, where the Fascists gained a reputation of bullying. Meetings in Manchester had a 
sense of notoriety and clashes between fascists and anti-fascists were common. The BUF’s 
public meetings were met with resistance, a point that influenced both their rise and their fall 
from political influence. At a meeting in Belle Vue, Manchester in October 1933, disturbances 
occurred. Between 800-900 members attended the meeting, many travelled by coach from 
surrounding areas of Lancashire and Mosley himself travelled by train from London. Mosley 
spoke for some time on his economic policy, at the end of the speech, a fight broke out at the 
back of the room between the stewards and a female interrupter. A witness at the meeting told 
the Manchester Guardian of the events that unfolded. 
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A man sitting next to the protester intervened with the stewards who 
aimed to throw her out. The stewards then set about kicking both of them 
out, resulting in a fight breaking out. He shouted out 'They are trying to 
murder me'; his screams were pitiful to hear. I am not a Communist, but I 
do not think that people should be treated as this wretched man was.138 
Further violence broke out after the meeting when several fascists descended on a small 
group of people who sang ‘The Red Flag’ over the national anthem. Similar violent patterns 
remained throughout the meetings of the BUF, demonstrating to the electorate how 
unelectable the party was. The British Union of Fascists offered a deeper threat to western 
civilisation than the political destruction of the national government throughout the 1930s.  
The BUF continued to develop a militant approach, attempting to resonate within the youth 
cultures. By autumn of 1933 the local headquarters in Manchester had organised itself into a 
position where it could field a boxing team to fight the local I.C.I works at Blackley.139 
Boxing was by and large the most popular sport within the party, but a gym was fitted out in 
the basements of the Manchester headquarters for its members to practise and train for 
various sports and games. By practising violent sports, it attracted the politically disengaged 
who identified themselves with blood and violence, rather than the evolution of fascism in 
British politics.  
The glamour exhibited at demonstrations like Belle Vue, attempted to orchestrate glory, 
imperial values and the politics of change.140 Mosley attempted to portray the strength of the 
movement through its organisation and uniform. The fact that members practised sports like 
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boxing and fencing wasn’t a coincidence and it all contributed to the showmanship of the 
BUF. The motivation to join the union had become greater influenced by its style, weakening 
the party’s sustainability as a political threat. 
Some people identified themselves with the social opportunities the BUF offered. Sporting 
rivalries became more important to some members than the political goals of the party. 
Rumours of a potential coup of branch members was leaked in a September 1933 edition of 
the Manchester Evening News, but senior officials soon dismissed this.141 An element of 
truth must have been present as soon after Mosley made wholesale expulsions of its 
members to weed out the less desirable elements, who ran the branches more as social clubs 
rather than political organisations.142  
Mosley found further disruption in his party when District Leaders exaggerated the 
attendance figures in their meetings. Nellie Driver describes the ‘cooked’ reports and how 
the true reflection of the BUF’s successes rested within the poor election figures. 
I am also afraid that in their enthusiasm and in their desire to please and 
impress the leader. Some of the District leaders gave him exaggerated 
ideas about the progress of the movement. Many reports from Districts 
were carefully ‘cooked’ and meetings that were flops were written up as 
highly successful. Several bad blunders were made through these false 
reports. Election campaigns were held which showed up our lack of 
support in the low number of votes cast for our candidates.143  
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After adopting the ‘Fascism next time’ policy in 1935 where it was agreed that the party 
wouldn’t challenge any elections at that time, the BUF aimed to fight half of the 10 
constituencies in the forthcoming general election. It prepared well and selected 
constituencies based on the strength and support within the local area, the availability of a 
candidate also played a determining factor.  
Table B, Distribution of prospective parliamentary candidates in areas of high BUF 
support. 
 
It is clear from the election plans that the three main regions considered by the BUF, were 
Manchester, Leeds and London, where they aimed to contest a total of 18 seats out of a 
possible 78, ten of which were to be fought in London.  
The five candidates in Manchester were selected on the grounds of their rank and popularity 
within the party. Thomas Davies, a local miner and former soldier was to be fielded in the 
Area Number of seats in the area Number of seats contested by the BUF  
Percentage of possible BUF 
representation (%) 
Manchester 10 5 50 
Leeds 6 3 50 
London 61 10 33 
Liverpool 11 3 27.2 
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Gorton constituency. In Hulme, R. T. Parkyn was selected, another local man and former 
soldier. Captain L. Wright, the Chief Propaganda Officer for the North-West area was the 
candidate for the Exchange constituency. R. R. Bellamy, the Chief of Northern Propaganda 
was to represent the Blackley constituency. Bellamy felt that the constituents of Blackley 
were conscious of the local Jewish community, which in turn provided him with the 
opportunity to exploit this feeling of animosity. Finally, the last prospective candidate for the 
Manchester area was L. E. Griffith, who was to fight for the working class Moss Side 
constituency. The five candidates were all popular within the BUF movement and the 
constituencies they represented were strongholds for the party. However, the prospect of 
challenging a general election never progressed for the BUF, the movement had been 
eclipsed by the time the next general election was held in 1945. 
The BUF had few opportunities to test the electorate’s response to the fascist movement but 
in 1938 they contested the local municipal elections. The BUF challenged four regions 
within Manchester that year. Miss Margaret Pye served the All Saints ward; James 
Simmonds in the South Gorton area, F. Fowden in the Collyhurst Ward, and Bernard Talbot 
in the St. George’s ward. The candidates were all recognised as relatively prominent within 
their local regions, though not nationally known.  
The manifesto proposed was replicated across all four wards. It took a stance against 
‘Communism, Cant and Corruption’ as quoted by Margaret Pye. 144 The party carefully 
positioned itself against two elements within the manifesto, Communism and Religion. It 
released party pamphlets that played both Socialism and Religion against one another, titled, 
‘Socialists say: - ‘Abolish Religion’. The leaflet then went on to condemn Manchester 
Labour MP’s for voting in favour of the ‘Anti-God Congress’. On the same pamphlet, it 
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quotes the leader of the 'Union of Godless' as having said 'Remember, that the struggle 
against Religion is the struggle for Socialism'.145 
The wards chosen for the municipal elections were predominantly Catholic and generally 
working class which they attempted to connect with through the suffering of the cotton 
industry and anti-Semitism. Propaganda was published in the run up to the election, branding 
the Jewish population as the ‘financial ruling elite’, which aimed to invoke unrest within the 
cotton community. Party pamphlets demonstrated through this through headlines such as:  
'None Shall Stuff – while others starve – Poverty in an age of plenty. The rich have all – the 
poor have none. So it will ever be while the parties and the financiers rule'146 
Every speech and pamphlet ran an anti-Semitic rhetoric. Throughout Mosley’s policies and 
manifesto, he attempted to scapegoat the Jewish population by blaming them for the 
economic depression and suggesting they found benefit in the midst of suffering. Anti-
Semitic hostility derived out of waves of immigration in the early twentieth century. By 
1900, following years of persecution of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe; Britain’s 
Jewish population had risen to around 160,000, which represented 0.3 per cent of the total 
population.147 Most fascists devoutly believed that the real power exercised by the Jews lay 
in the economic sphere where their roles as financiers and company directors ensured British 
economic policy favoured City investment and foreign industrial markets like that of those in 
Japan’s cotton trade, where Jewish factories ‘undercut’ British produce. 
Mosley attempted to present a message to the working class, suggesting he would 
redistribute the power attained by Jewish monopolies under his policy of insulation. The 
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BUF caused unsettlement amongst the working class, yet that unrest failed to influence a 
shift in the electorate of 1938. 
The British Union further attempted to resonate with Christian religious communities at a 
time of social instability. They campaigned for the freedom of religion in education, an issue 
that was publicly supported and one that exposed the other election candidates. The BUF 
supported the right for Catholic children to attend Catholic schools. The British Union had 
advocated for the freedom of religion ever since the New Party’s representative, Allen 
Young polled in the Ashton by-election of 1931 with this policy as his focus in a move that 
resulted in many Catholics resigning from the Ashton Labour Party, only to later join Young 
for his religious conscience. Tension on this matter rose even further when Gordon, the 
Labour candidate attending a Roman Catholic Church service, was denounced from the 
pulpit by the priest for his evasive attitude on the topic of freedom of education. The priest 
called for the Churchgoers to vote for the candidate who would allow ‘freedom of 
conscience when Catholic principles conflict with party discipline.’ 
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Table C, Manchester Municipal Election Results in constituencies with Fascist 
candidates, November 1938.148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the 1938 municipal elections in Manchester were damning for collectively the 
BUF achieved only 4.9 per cent of the total votes cast across all wards. Fowden in 
Collyhurst, totalling a percentage of 12.04 per cent, achieved the highest percentage of votes 
for the BUF. Labour’s Johnston received a total of 87.59 per cent of the electorate. Whilst 
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Ward Votes Cast % Of Vote Votes Cast as % of poll 
Collyhurst    
Johnston W. (Lab) 1709 87.59% 30.2% 
Fowden F. (Fascist) 242 12.40%  
St Georges   41.0% 
Kearns J. H (Con) 2267 53.39%  
Clapham J. G (Lab) 1840 43.33%  
Talbot A. (Fascist) 139 3.29%  
Gorton South   29.26% 
Adams T. H (Lab) 3643 93.91%  
Simmonds J. (Fascist) 236 6.08%  
All Saints   37.66% 
Harper R. S jnr. (Con) 1817 64.63%  
Gower E. A (Lab) 968 34.43%  
Pye Miss M. E. 
(Fascist) 23 0.81%  
Whittington L. (Ind) 3 0.10%  
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Fowden’s result might be recognised as opportunistic he was only opposed by one party, 
which may have naturally gifted him more votes from the maverick section of the electorate. 
The same can be said for Simmonds in the Gorton South region. Simmonds managed to win 
only 6.08 per cent of the vote against the Labour candidate, a figure falling considerably 
short of what was expected when considering the nature of his campaign. Simmonds targeted 
the working class in the run up to the election with pamphlets (see Appendix 1) that read, 
'The snob and the parasite must go and the rich must not eat cake until the poor have 
bread'.149 The BUF aggressively targeted the working class and the Irish Catholics during 
their campaign, these regions were predominantly poorer areas with anti-Semitic 
prejudices.150  
What’s clear is the propaganda and party pamphlets released in the run up the election, had 
little effect in gathering momentum for the BUF.  An example of failed propaganda derives 
from Fowden’s campaign (see Appendix 2). He quoted Socialists as saying, ‘Christianity, 
indeed is a cemetery of dead religions’, which many socialists would have rejected.151 Such a 
caption was designed to inspire voters to move away from the Labour party and vote the 
British Union. The BUF were attempting to target long-term Labour voters using fictional 
quotes from religious bodies. The election results hardly came as a surprise, when analysing 
the quality of the pamphlets used during the campaign. It’s clear the BUF identified areas of 
vulnerability for the population of Lancashire, yet it could not provide the solution. The 
percentage of the poll that voted suggested a disengaged electorate, the poll averaged 34.52 
per cent.   
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The municipal elections of 1938 reveals the weakness of the BUF in Lancashire. This should 
have been the opportunity for the BUF to drive support for its cause as it campaigned 
aggressively against a vulnerable government. The momentum of the movement was in 
decline after the passing of the Public Order Act in 1936. The Act withdrew the glamour and 
fashion the party once exhibited through its inability to wear uniform and march in public. 
After 1938, the BUF spiralled into a decline as war approached. The National Socialists of 
Germany were on the path to take Western Civilisation to War by 1938, although Mosley 
emphasised his opposition to war in an attempt to offset such views. 
After the municipal elections, the BUF challenged three parliamentary by-elections in 1940, 
in one of which Lancashire’s F. Haslam failed to acquire more than 1.3 per cent of the 
vote.152 The by-election results of 1940 epitomised the affect the British Union of Fascists 
had on society at a national level. The plans the BUF had for the by-election never bore fruit 
because the movement had been considerably weakened by 1940.153 
Table D, 1940 Parliamentary by-election154 
Area Candidate Percentage of vote % 
Lancashire, Middleton & Prestwich F. Haslam 1.3% (418) 
West Ham, Silvertown T. P. Moran 1% (151) 
Leeds, North-East S. Allen 2.9% (722) 
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The three regions in which the BUF fielded candidates for the by-election were the 
strongholds for Fascist support across the nation, yet it failed to rise above three per cent of 
the electorate in 1940. The damning result was justified when considering that in 1940, 
European Fascism under the banner of Hitler, was at war with Britain. Further to this, the 
BUF’s leader Oswald Mosley had been imprisoned under the Defence regulation bill, leaving 
the British Union of Fascists party with no direction.  
The BUF party membership was heavily influenced by the fashion and culture it represented, 
this subsequently influenced an unstable flow of membership retention in Lancashire. The 
BUF failed to retain this type of member after the Public Order Act, resulting in the 
movement never posing anything more than an ideological threat to the political system.  
The BUF blamed Lancashire’s economic suffering on the Jewish financial elite, yet their 
anti-Semitic fuelled 1938 municipal campaign failed to stimulate more than five per cent of 
the electorate to vote in favour of the British union. The habitants of Lancashire were not as 
affected by Jewish residency as those who resided in East London, coupled with a view that 
an ‘insulated empire’ wouldn’t necessarily bring immediate recovery to the cotton industry, 
the BUF failed to connect their value with the people of Lancashire. A reviving economy, a 
party culture strangled by the State, and a failed election campaign were all key factors in the 
failure of fascism in Lancashire.  
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Appendix 2 
A BUF political pamphlet for Fowden
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Chapter Four – Fascism in East London 
In the early 1930s the politics in the East End of London became a battleground for social 
and political movements. The British fascist movement emerged out of the economic 
depression and the reluctance of the traditional party system to take immediate action in 
resolving Britain’s unemployment crisis. Tensions quickly arose in East London and violent 
clashes became common ground at political demonstrations. This chapter aims to analyse the 
effect the BUF imposed on the government and party politics, as well as the lives of the 
people in East London.  
Economic hardship swept over East London in the 1930s. Local trades were in decline and 
local communities felt threatened by an increase in Jewish immigration. Such cultural and 
psychological fears were the prelude to the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism in East London. 
Oswald Mosley and the fascist movement shaped the identity and social experience of 
individuals in East London. He subscribed to the notion that the British economy was going 
to collapse in an ‘apocalyptic’ fashion in the early 1930s. This influenced his paramilitary 
tactics and sense of urgency to become the nation’s saviour.155 
The BUF embarked on three phases, the pre-1934 politically motivated paramilitary fascist, 
the anti-Semitic and violent fascist and finally Fascism as a bureaucratic peace collective.156 
Many inhabitants of East London followed this journey that began with social and economic 
reform, it soon outgrew these issues and collaborated with anti-Semitic ideas, leading finally 
onto a split in the party, where one remained vigilant and highly anti-Semitic, the other took 
a peaceful resistance to the Second World War.  
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Mosley had great difficulty in balancing the two types of groups associated with the 
movement. First, there were those who joined based on national concerns and who felt on 
reflection, Mosley’s fascism provided a solution to Britain’s social and economic problems 
and therefore should ascertain power through elections, a sustainable but long-term strategy. 
Then there were the revolutionaries, who wanted to gain power through physical force and 
aggressive propaganda. William Joyce was amongst this group of members who aimed to 
provoke unrest in the areas of high Jewish settlement.  
Mosley wanted to address the economic crisis immediately. To do this he needed unlimited 
control. The BUF ideology was structured with this sense of immediacy and urgency. The 
BUF adopted a paramilitary style and dictated with irrational impulses, often complicating 
Mosley’s detailed economic programme. This chapter aims to understand the effect BUF 
activity had on the inhabitants of East London, the extent to which the BUF gathered support 
and why it was a movement that invoked popular interest. This chapter also identifies the 
effects of the Home Office and their suppressive tactics in preventing the party from being at 
liberty to rally against and resist opposing forces such as those occupied under the anti-
fascist movement.  
Fascist activity began to gather considerable momentum in London in 1933 and 
consequently the government increased its surveillance. The Home Office called a 
conference in November 1933, where it was decided that the BUF, like the Communist 
Party, would be placed under political surveillance by Special Branch, a dedicated force 
ordered to protect national security, with MI5 assigned to reporting the results.157 The 
decision was then put back for six months due to a lack of funding. Heightened political 
surveillance and neither the BUF and anti-fascists showing few signs of slowing down meant 
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that, Lord Trenchard, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, was able to persuade the Home 
Office to expand Special Branch from 134 to 169 officers in July 1935.158 
Rallies like Olympia on 7 June 1934 revealed the acceleration of the BUF in London and 
how they could mobilise en masse, attendance figures of up to 10,000 people were reported. 
The Home Office had to act to control what looked like a Fascist epidemic.  
Olympia and the Battle of Cable Street were trigger events that led to a higher level of State 
surveillance and eventually the passing of the Public Order Act of 1936. As well as 
expansion of the secret police force, the Home Office ordered a stronger visible presence on 
the streets. More police had been put on the streets of East London between 1936 and 1937 
than ever before, large numbers of additional Special Constables were assigned to normal 
duties, while much of the police establishment were assigned to maintaining order at over 
one thousand public meetings between the summer months of 1936 to 1939, the great 
majority of which were occupied by both Fascists and Anti-Fascists.159  
After the national government passed the Public Order Act of 1936 and the economy reached 
a level of stability, Mosley’s apocalyptic economic expectations began failing to materialise. 
Mosley publicly identified the party with anti-Semitism in a tactical attempt to incite hatred 
to the Jewish population because it offered new distraction to the recovering economic crisis, 
thus having a maximum effect on the working and middle-classes.160  
Reg Groves, on the executive of the Socialist League and former member of the Communist 
Party challenged the BUF in a pamphlet he wrote in 1936. The BUF was attacked for its anti-
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Semitic regime designed to cause divisions within the working class.161 Groves, a member of 
the Marxist League, advanced the Marxist argument in the pamphlet by suggesting the 
purpose of anti-Semitism was to fragment the working class as a prelude to the nullification 
of its own strength. ‘They set Gentile against Jew and Catholic against Protestant… Division 
amongst the workers, particularly in the East End where, for over a generation, the workers 
have stood together in their common interest, is the first step to the ultimate destruction of 
every freedom and every right that the workers have wrested for themselves from the 
capitalist.’162 
It was accepted by the Left that capitalism fostered prejudice and discrimination. Without 
capitalist competition and a society without competition, anti-Semitism would wither away. 
He suggested that Mosley was distracting attention away from what he believed was a 
common enemy, the Capitalist State. Mosley relied on the growing frustrations of the public 
and therefore the increasing economic disparity, to direct the blame towards the Jewish 
population.  Mosley believed it was the Jewish financiers who created the depression, rather 
than the greed of the capitalist state, he then began to paint this image of Jewish hatred in his 
campaign. Both the Communists and the BUF were aware that the rise in unemployment and 
the saturation of the labour market accelerated the reach of their campaigns, therefore 
shaping their policies around the working classes was paramount to success.  
East London was home to a significant number of working class Jews, many of whom chose 
to affiliate with the Communist Party. The appeal of the Communist party, according to Joe 
Jacobs was threefold: communism was responsible for bringing an end to Jewish persecution 
in Russia; the appalling conditions of the tailoring trade of which employed much of the East 
London Jewish proletariat; and lastly, the escape from the ghetto that political affiliation 
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offered.163 Jewish orthodoxy decayed after the First World War, communism provided an 
alternative moral discipline to the Jewish population of East London.164  
The Communist and anti-fascist opposition provided Mosley with the opportunity to 
reposition his party. Exploiting anti-Semitism in Britain was one of the first signs of decay 
and desperation for the BUF.165 The Fascists knew after Olympia that they were losing 
members at a considerable rate; their only chance was to divide the working class by 
alienating the Jewish race from everything in society. Social anti-Semitism was evident in 
Britain, certain social organisations like golf clubs refused to allow Jewish members.166 The 
BUF recognised this as an opportunity to build on existing animosity and decided to target 
financiers, Jewish shop owners and Jewish house owners. Jew-baiting commenced as part of 
Mosley’s new strategy. As a result, Jewish resistance was building and was playing a 
prominent role in the growing number of anti-fascist demonstrations, so much so that the 
rivalry was beginning to concern the Metropolitan Police and the Home Secretary.167 
Ethnic animosity existed in the local economies of East London, many disputes occurring 
between Jewish traders and non-Jewish working-class traders for it was felt the Jewish 
traders abused the trading laws. The BUF recognised this as an opportunity to turn such 
social animosity into anti-Semitic feeling and became vocal in resisting the new Sunday 
trading regulations, passed on 1 May 1937.168 A Mosleyite from Stamford Hill commented 
his grievances in the BUF newspaper Action, he complained of the ‘flagrant abuse of the 
Shops Act by local Jewish shopkeepers’ in particular the trading activity ‘on Friday’s and 
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Sunday’s after 2pm in such places as Oldhill Street, N.16, Ridley Road, E.8 and various 
other Jewish market centres’.169 
Many Fascists publicly demonstrated their frustration with the local Jewish traders, stirring 
anti-Semitic tension in East London. Barrington Brand and his wife, Rose Brand, proprietors 
of a hair salon in Hackney, reported to the police that they were being victimised by the local 
Jewish population. Brand was described as a local fascist by police sources, victimisation 
was inevitable when Brand displayed abusive notices in his shop window in full view of the 
public. An exhibition of recurring messages suggested Brand was dealing with growing 
‘poverty’, he attributed this to the ‘filthy cut prices of the Jews’, a message he was keen to 
present in his window.170 The BUF made a concerted effort to recruit shopkeepers in this 
period. On the one hand, this attempt attracted interest with many local traders, some even 
decided to advertise in the BUF press. Bertrand Beard a local English tailor, invited 
Mosleyites to trade from his shop on Kingsland High Street.171 On the other hand, many 
could have remained silent for fear of a financial impact on their business. 
By 1936 tensions between fascist and anti-fascists were high within the community. The 
BUF were attempting to turn any social ill-feeling towards anti-Semitic feeling. Anti-
Semitism by their definition, was a response to the Jewish victimisation. The working class 
Jewish community continued to respond to the BUF in a militant manner, heckling and often 
clashing during demonstrations.  
Tensions didn’t simmer after the Board of Deputies, the Anglo-Jewry representatives 
supported the Home Office’s reaction to prevent “baiting” speakers, or such occurrences of 
violence would be almost inevitable. Sir Phillip Game, urged the Board to do anything to 
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bring the Jewish anti-fascists to a more sensible frame of mind’, arguing that if deprived of 
publicity and more or less ignored, the BUF’s wings would very soon be clipped’.172 By 
accepting fascist anti-Semitism and offering no resistance the Jewish community felt they 
were accepting the validity of anti-Jewish claims, which provided further ammunition to 
anti-Semites.173 
To combat Mosley’s attempted alliance with parts of the working classes, the Socialist 
League, led by Groves, released propaganda juxtaposing Mosley with the evil elements of 
capitalism. In a pamphlet titled East End Crisis! Socialism, the Jews and Fascism, released 
in 1936, the Communists targeted Mosley’s unification with big businesses. The pamphlet 
exposed the Fascists for trying to identify with the working classes, whilst not having their 
best interests at hand. 
It is indeed; from such business interests that Fascist propaganda receives 
help and support. 'Businessmen,' said Mosley recently, 'do support us, 
especially in the North, where they have experienced Red Terror' ('News 
Review,' October 22, 1936). In the North Wages there are as low, if not 
lower, than in any of the East End sweatshops. Unemployment is higher 
there than anywhere else, except perhaps in parts of Wales. It is not a 
'Red Terror' that exists in the North but a black plague, a fiendish and 
horrible plague that breaks homes and hearts, that kills youth and 
happiness in the homes of men and women for whom big business has no 
further use. To protect its power, Big Business will spend money like 
water, though it refuses bread to the unemployed. It will build big armies 
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and navies for war abroad: at home it will create political armies to foster 
division and terror among the workers.174 
The East End was an ideal place for street corner politics. The prevailing conditions played 
into the hands of a party limited on finances and manpower. Substandard and overcrowded 
housing, poverty and low incomes with a lack of recreational facilities drove people to the 
solutions offered by street corner politicians. Curious crowds gathered to hear a message 
never presented by a mainstream party. The BUF were prepared to alienate and scapegoat a 
race that didn’t align with their beliefs and economic plans.  
The relentless street corner speeches and pamphleteering was bound to cause more 
resentment than a genuine gathering of interest. Opposition grew and with it did violence. In 
order to provoke unrest and unsettlement the Blackshirts intensified the feeling. As reported 
by the News Chronicle, doors of Jewish shops were bolted, lighted fireworks were sent 
through windows of Jewish shops and people were threatened with letters and eventually 
feared leaving the house.175 
The first large East End fascist rally took place in Victoria Park on 7 June 1936. Action 
suggested that 100,000 gathered to hear the leader.176 Other publications estimated figures 
that ranged between 3,000 and 50,000, but the police reported an attendance of 5,000. The 
meeting ended in an out of control manner despite a well mobilised police presence standing 
at around five hundred strong on foot, sixty mounted and seven police vans. The crowd 
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dispersed at the end of the rally and fighting broke out, leaving one Blackshirt unconscious 
and a total of nine arrests, most of whom were discharged by the court.177 
Similar rallies occurred night after night in East London. Such events influenced a strong 
opposition resulting in a watchful eye from the Metropolitan Police. Geoffrey Lloyd, under 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, announced that the London police had been present at 
no fewer than 536 meetings in August, 603 in September and 647 in October.178 The BUF, 
despite suffering a considerable blow in membership figures after 1934, were still 
campaigning aggressively and causing considerable tension within the East End in late 1936. 
So much so that Geoffrey Lloyd was forced to act to control both police resources and the 
potential conflicts between the BUF and the anti-fascists. The change in the law was a 
consequence of the commissioner of the police, Sir Philip Game’s inability to control the 
planned march on Cable Street in October 1936. Game realised he did not have the resources 
to prevent the march and its planned counter demonstration. The perfectly legal march could 
not be prevented, leaving Game with no other option but to divert the march into the West 
End, to avoid confrontation between 1,900 fascists and 100,000 anti-fascists.179  
Prior to Mosley accepting the proposed re-route, the anti-fascists had erected barricades and 
smashed the glass of five shops on Cable Street. This tactic was designed to prevent the 
police from clearing the area. The re-route prevented what would have been a devastating 
demonstration. The violence of Cable Street occurred in the wider areas of East London; 85 
people were arrested of whom 79 were anti-fascist.180 The six fascist arrests were in 
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Trafalgar Square when the police refused a fascist meeting. A total of 40 police and 30 
civilians were injured.  
The number of anti-fascist arrests at Cable Street suggests that the Fascists were aiming to 
avoid violence by 1936. Throughout the journey of the BUF, a shift from aggression to 
peaceful disruption can be seen, it can be argued that this fell in-line with the economic state 
of the country and through state suppression under the Defence Regulation 18b.  
After the Battle of Cable Street in 1936, the local authorities leaned heavily on the state to 
intervene. Richard Thurlow describes the Battle of Cable Street as the straw that broke the 
camel's back with state intervention.181 Indeed, the events that unfolded represented the 
trigger mechanism for the passing of the Public Order Act. The order was created and 
presented to cabinet with urgency four weeks after the events that unfolded at Olympia, yet 
never received funding as the Home Office recognised themselves as equipped to deal with 
domestic issues.182 The police were intervening in Fascist meetings as early as the meeting at 
Manchester’s Free Trade Hall in March 1933. The forces were integrated with one another, 
resulting in them being sufficiently mobile and able to deal with many small conflicts.183 
The Public Order Act of 1936 prevented any person who in any public place or at any public 
meeting wearing uniform signifying his/her association with any political organisation. The 
act also prohibited the formation or gathering of any quasi-military organisations. If the 
Blackshirts or any other political organisation wanted to arrange a public meeting under the 
new legislation, they would have to seek permission from the Commissioner, Sir Philip 
Game. The Commissioner reserved the right to prevent or suspend a meeting in order to ‘foil 
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serious disorder’.184 Eventually, after relentless violence and disruption in the Jewish areas of 
East London, Game stopped all marches and processions taking part in the main Jewish 
sections of East London from 13 March 1937 to the start of the Second World War.185 Game 
had to apply in writing to the Home Office to extend the act every three months; the Home 
Secretary extended the ban from its implementation in 1936 to the Second World War 
through three monthly applications.186  
‘Herbert Morrison argued, that in the aftermath of Cable Street, all the political parties in the 
East End of London wanted the Fascists banned’.187 After the Public Order Act was passed 
and renewed annually, according to the memoirs of Sir John Simon, the Home Secretary 
between 1935 and 1937 stated that the act ‘worked like a dream’ and suppressed political 
disruption with minimal effect to civil liberties and freedom of expression.188  
The government was clearly paving a road to stability and the BUF recognised this shift and 
moved away from street violence in the later years of the 1930s. Major Fuller presented this 
argument to Mosley as early as 1935, warning him to deter the aggressive image and stop 
talking about revolution and dictatorship as it was alienating a proportion of its voters. 'It 
must not be overlooked that this is an old country, very solid, stable and matter of fact. Most 
Blackshirts are too young to realise this… in a revolutionary country they would be right, but 
in a conservative country they are wrong.'189 The BUF’s then Director of Political 
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Organisation, F. M. Box also took this stance, resulting in an orthodox political campaign 
known as the ‘Box-Fuller’ approach preceding.190     
The BUF inevitably accepted that coming to power required a long-haul strategy rather than 
a quick dash that looked feasible prior to 1934.191 After many setbacks in 1935, that 
discouraged a challenge to power, the BUF reversed policy and in adjusting their approach, 
placed their attention in the forthcoming 1937 municipal elections of East London and 
geared up for the subsequent general election.  
Throughout 1936, numerous internal changes were introduced to drive innovation and front 
the BUF’s new direction. A revised uniform system was introduced that rewarded the elite 
Division One members with a new uniform symbolising the meritocratic structure. The BUF 
released a new weekly publication, Action, supposedly for the more educated and politically 
engaged. It read like normal newspapers, incorporating sections on sports and films. Mosley 
was aiming for a wide and mainstream network, rather than his current disenfranchised 
following that was enthused by aggressive anti-Semitic rhetoric.  
A new administrative body, the Department of Organisation was formed and led by Francis-
Hawkins, former Director-General of the defunct ‘Blackshirt Organisation’. The Public 
Order Act forced this shift, resulting in the BUF de-emphasising the paramilitary nature of its 
structure. Its operational procedures were officially demilitarised in December 1936.192 The 
Public Order Act also aimed to broaden the legal scope and application of ‘insulting words 
and behaviour’ in public speeches that would incite violence and breach peace. The act 
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influenced divisions within the leadership of the party, subsequently forcing new direction 
and apparent progressive transition through cuts to personnel. 
The BUF had very little choice but to realign their internal structure and strategy after the 
Battle of Cable Street. The state became stronger after the passing of the Public Order Act 
1936 and the anti-fascists were growing at an alarming rate. The BUF would never be able to 
increase their membership figures if they continued to fight with the anti-fascists. 
The BUF were forced to reduce the number of marches it pursued after Cable Street and this 
had a positive effect on the membership figures in London, which were reported to have 
increased by 2,000.193 Support for the BUF was continually analysed by the police through 
the monitoring of the number of public meetings held and the attendance figures of such 
meetings. A total of 131 fascist meetings were reported in November 1936 in London. The 
average number of attendees had reduced to 240 per meeting. Out of the 131 meetings in 
November, only seven led to acts of disorder, a statistic that undoubtedly demonstrates the 
strength and mobilisation of the state.194 
The number of meetings began to increase again in February 1937, a total of 222 meetings 
were documented with the average attendance figure of 1400 people. The BUF had 
restructured internally and pledged itself to the 1937 municipal elections that were due to 
take place in March. In-line with the growth in fascist activity came a rise in anti-fascist 
meetings under the guidance of the Communist party, as demonstrated in the table below; an 
expected incline in the run up to the municipal elections. 
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Table E, Fascist and Anti-Fascist Meetings in London: December 1946 – February 
1937.195  
Month Fascist meetings Anti-Fascist meetings 
December 61 70 
January 103 141 
February 222 184 
 
The 1937 municipal elections became the focal point for the BUF as it campaigned 
relentlessly in the run up to the elections, with the number of meetings held in London 
doubling between January and February. Three L.C.C constituencies were contested in the 
East End of London in 1937.196 Bethnal Green, Stepney and Shoreditch were the areas 
focused upon by the BUF. East London in the 1930s was an area suffering from significant 
overcrowding, this had a detrimental effect on the levels of poverty, combine this with an 
area of high Jewish settlement, the BUF could exploit the social issues resting within the 
foundations of East London.  
Bethnal Green encompassed an area of 759 acres and was registered as the fifth smallest 
metropolitan borough.197 The 1931 census revealed a population size of 108,194, making for 
an average population density of 142.4 persons per acre, second only to Shoreditch.198 
Bethnal Green was in an adverse state of congestion. The New Survey of London Life and 
Labour Eastern Study revealed the extent of this overcrowding and its influence on poverty 
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levels. A rate of 1.35 persons per room was discovered, the third highest of the London 
boroughs, as well as 6.9 inhabitants living with more than three to a room, above twice the 
average for London.199 This directly impacted the levels of poverty – 17.8 per cent of 
Bethnal Green’s population lived in poverty.200 
Bethnal Green’s industrial environment revolved around traditional domestic manufacturing, 
this included the making of furniture and ancillary trades.201 The residents in the Northeast 
division provided an important source of recruitment for the BUF for it was predominantly 
lower to middle and middle-classes.  
It can be assumed that the BUF had realised Bethnal Green’s fertile ground as early as 
December 1933, for a branch was referenced in the internal bulletin of the Fascist News. The 
branch soon terminated in the spring 1934 due to restrictions imposed on Fascist propaganda. 
These restrictions were enforced as a subsequence of the ‘local Jewish element’ and the 
threat of disruption to the community.202 The BUF decided to operate from a branch in the 
neighbouring village, Bow up until July 1935, when the Bethnal Green branch revived. Once 
re-opened the branch remained incredibly active; over eighty successful propaganda 
meetings were reported between July and December 1935.203  
Almost inevitably, anti-Semitism became the significant objective for the BUF in the run up 
to the municipal elections in 1937. The economic difficulties East London faced enabled the 
BUF and candidates like Raven Thomson to scapegoat the Jewish population in areas like 
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Bethnal Green Thomson had a threatening racist undertone, delivering speeches to East 
London crowds that saw him in front of the court.  
Stepney shared many of the same characteristics of poverty and overcrowding. The surface 
area of Stepney was almost double that of Bethnal Green at 1,766 acres, yet Stepney’s high 
population depressed the limited housing stock available.204 Stepney occupied an average 
person per acre rate of 127.5.205 Stepney also had an alarmingly high rate of inhabitants per 
room with 1.33, the fourth highest in the county.206 Stepney had a subsequent poverty rate of 
15.5 per cent, leaving the ground fertile for the BUF to open a branch.  
The principal economic driver for Stepney was the textile and garment industry. In 1938, 
over 30,000 people, representing 21 per cent of the male and female workforce were 
employed in the clothing industry.207 Dock work and other distributive trades also 
contributed significantly to Stepney’s economy. Seasonal variations in employment 
including subcontracting characterised much of Stepney and Bethnal Green’s economy.208 
Shoreditch was the most densely populated borough of London.209 It didn’t occupy the 
largest population, 97,042 per the 1931 census, yet the average population density was 147.5 
persons per acre.210 Overcrowding affected the levels of poverty across London, Shoreditch 
suffered from poverty levels as high as 18 per cent. Hackney maintained 65.5 persons per 
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acre, 7.4 per cent of which lived in poverty; the two measures were intrinsically linked.211 
Hackney and Shoreditch were industrialised areas, specialising in domestic manufacturing 
and workshop production. The areas often hosted seasonal and sub-contracted manufacturing 
of goods ranging mostly in the boot and shoe, fur, furniture and cabinet making trades.212  
Similar themes of poor social housing and conditions ran through the boroughs of East 
London. Most of the Jewish population were either born into or lived through these 
conditions.213 It was estimated by the New Survey of London Life, that 13.7 per cent of the 
East London Jews were living in poverty.214 The poverty and overcrowding issues were then 
pinned on the Jewish population in the run up to the 1937 municipal elections.  
Another point to note is the correlation between the cyclical economic patterns that affected 
the boroughs in East London.215 Unemployment levels fluctuating in-line with demand, an 
issue Mosley attempted to address in his manifesto.  
Mosley campaigned aggressively in East London, the BUF focused on recruitment, doorstep 
propaganda & newspaper sales, he aimed to challenge any communist sympathy and conquer 
the streets. The Blackshirt reported in January 1936, that the streets of East London had been 
won, propelling the party into the path of the 1937 municipal elections.216  
By early 1936, the BUF were attracting the highest audiences recorded at Victoria Park.217 
The speakers also established a presence at Russia Lane, a traditional Labour stronghold in 
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the northeast division.218 Such progress instilled the party with hope when approaching the 
elections in March 1937. 
Two BUF candidates stood in each of the wards of Bethnal Green, North East; Limehouse 
(Stepney); and Shoreditch. The results were far from devastating for the BUF when 
considering the high settlement of Jews in the regions contested, however the results were to 
be the best the BUF ever received.  
Table F, 1937 East London Municipal Elections219 
Bethnal Green (South-West) 
Candidates Votes 
T. Dawson (Labour) 7,777 
Mrs R. S. Keeling (Labour) 7,756 
A. Raven Thomson (B.U.F) 3,028 
E. G. Clarke (B.U.F) 3,022 
A. J. Irvine (Liberal) 2,298 
H. K. Sadler (Liberal) 2,228 
 
Stepney (Limehouse) 
Candidates Votes 
R. Coppock (Labour) 8,272 
Mrs H. M. Whately (Labour) 8,042 
V. G. Weeple (Municipal Reform) 2,542 
G. E. Abrahams (Municipal Reform) 2,431 
Mrs. A. Brock Griggs (B.U.F) 2,086 
C. Wegg-Prosser (B.U.F) 2,086 
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Shoreditch 
Candidates Votes 
Mrs H. Girling (Labour) 11,098 
S. W. Jeger (Labour) 11,069 
S. L. Price (Municipal Progressive) 3,303 
R. S. Falk (Municipal Progressive) 3,217 
William Joyce (B.U.F) 2,564 
J. A. Bailey (B.U.F) 2,492 
C. E. Taylor (Independent Labour) 385 
 
Once the results were released on 6 March 1937, no dramatic changes had been made in 
shaping the swing of the election. The Fascists polled a total of 17.8 per cent of the total 
votes cast. Roughly 15,278 people voted for the Fascist party, most of the votes were 
attained in Bethnal Green, where Raven Thomson and Clarke received a combined effort of 
23.17 per cent of the vote and finished ahead of the Liberals. 
When reviewing the percentage of the vote the BUF received against the Jewish occupation 
in that area, the figures look considerably more impressive. East London housed roughly 
sixty per cent of Britain’s Jews. Bethnal Green received the highest number of votes across 
the three constituencies, despite it maintaining approximately 13,000 Jews in 1930, about 
twelve per cent of its population.220 The density of the Jewish population inevitably 
influenced the scope of what the BUF could achieve. Through the BUF’s anti-Semitic 
rhetoric, it could immediately expect to be eliminated from around twelve per cent of the 
total available vote. The Labour Party occupied almost 60 per cent of the vote, whether there 
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was a high proportion of Jews or not, the BUF imposed no threat on occupying a majority in 
Bethnal Green or any other of the challenged constituencies. What is more, the BUF only 
succeeded in achieving the number of votes they did due to the anti-Semitic rhetoric and the 
Jewish scapegoat they adopted, without which, the party would have been in even a less 
favourable petition.  
Raven Thomson was described in Special Branch reports as a ‘fanatical admirer of anything 
German and advocates copying the German National Socialists in toto’.221 In the wake of his 
candidature for the 1937 municipal election, he told a fascist sympathetic audience in East 
London, 
Believe me, I have the utmost contempt for the Jews and I regard them as 
the most miserable type of humanity… The Jew is ruining our country 
and we must get rid of him… The Jew can be no more help being a 
parasite than a louse can be a louse, we’ve got to be a healthy people and 
then we won't need to pick them off… [The Jew] can wrap himself in the 
folds of the Union Jack as much as he likes, [but] his nose sticks out over 
the top.222 
Thomson’s anti-Semitic rhetoric proved successful amongst the sympathetic crowds in 
Bethnal Green, yet it failed to capture the eye of the mainstream vote. Thomson went onto 
criticise the Jews for fostering war with Germany, ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. We 
all know the Jews have a great hatred against the German people and they will try to drag all 
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the nations into a war of revenge.223 The BUF, like Raven Thomson were not concerned by 
the cultural backlash their anti-Semitic rhetoric caused, yet it fostered greater opposition than 
it did attract new support. 
The local municipal elections gave Oswald Mosley no hope for building momentum for his 
party. In Shoreditch alone, fifty-seven meetings were scheduled with as many as five per 
night. Pooling resources into the municipal elections proved unsuccessful for the BUF; a 
strong representation in forthcoming elections became unforeseeable, especially when 
considering the way in which Chamberlain’s foreign policy was shaping, with incessant 
challenges to democracy from Hitler’s National Socialists. The municipal election results 
illustrate that even in their regional strongholds, the BUF never became more than a minority 
political subculture.   
As a consequence of failing to invoke popular support in the L.C.C election, the BUF 
experienced the most fatal crisis in its history. Only five days after the results were 
announced, on the 11 March, a widespread reduction in Headquarters personnel was 
announced. The reorganisation was precipitated by a 70 per cent reduction in income, the 
majority of which was previously contributed by foreign sources. Special Branch reported 
through the location of a secret bank of the BUF, that in the height of Mussolini’s Abyssinian 
campaign, the BUF received a total of £86,000 from Italian sources.224 By 1937, the 
subsidies from foreign sources had fallen to £7,630.225 Alongside administration changes that 
began in the latter half of 1936, it was announced in March that the Northern regional offices 
in Manchester were to be closed. In the national headquarters, 57 paid and voluntary staff 
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remained from the previous total of 129.226 All paid national speakers were dismissed as well 
as many the policy propaganda department. Among the senior officials, John Beckett and 
William Joyce were discharged, a victory for the bureaucratic members of the BUF who 
preferred to emphasise the intellectual dimension of party politics as opposed to aggressive 
anti-Semitic rhetoric.  
William Joyce and John Beckett went on to create the National Socialist League after being 
dismissed from the party during the cost-cutting exercise.227 The group remained militant and 
Joyce became critical of Mosley’s approach, suggesting he had been too enthralled with 
continental Fascism. The party soon dissolved in the wake of the Second World War, as like 
Mosley, the politically-conscious were also engaged in foreign affairs. The disunity between 
the NSL and the BUF adds to the argument that the BUF were dismantling around a 
strengthening government heading for war.  
On the other hand, Skidelsky argues that the financially constrained BUF party reignited its 
membership figures after embarking on a peace campaign that took headway after the 
hopeful return of Chamberlain from Munich in September 1938. Skidelsky argues the 
national movement again gathered a significant increase in membership figures, reviving the 
pre-1934 (Olympia) numbers of around 40,000.228 Evidence for such revival cannot be 
identified in East London, where a combination of active and non-active membership figures 
have been estimated between 5,075-5800.229 An estimation of East London’s active members 
shows an even smaller support base, 2,100-2,400.230 The East London members represented 
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around 70-80 per cent of all London membership in 1938.231 The membership figures 
demonstrate that there was still active and non-active support, but not to the extent to which 
Skidelsky details. 
The patterns that occurred in East London show a decline in active membership between 
1936 and 1938, with a minor increase in early 1939.232 A Special Branch report detailed the 
feeling of antagonism towards German foreign policy after the Czechoslovakian crisis, it 
stated: 
Many of their most ardent members in areas such as Bethnal Green, 
Limehouse and East Ham became imbued with a feeling of antagonism to 
Germany during the crisis week… This opposition to the movement’s line 
of policy has since crystallised into open rebellion on the part of some 
members and even local officials… This drift on the part of a section of its 
most valuable followers is causing much concern to headquarters.233 
The report also referenced an underwhelming response to a request for assistance during the 
crisis week peace demonstrations from East End branches.234 This resentment is also 
evidenced through the resignation of Limehouse leader Arthur Mason, who is believed to 
have been dismissed four weeks after the events that unfolded with Czechoslovakia, leaving 
the assumption that the two were related. The Limehouse branch was then subject to several 
inadequate leaders, resulting in great difficulty for it to sustain in the wake of the Second 
World War. 
                                                        
231 Ibid., 
232 Ibid., 
233 The National Archives in the Public Records Office, HO 144/21281/97-102. 
234 Ibid., 
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Arguably, one of the highest factors to the decline of the British Union of Fascists derived 
from peacetime conscription. Conscription revealed threefold, the failure of the BUF’s stance 
to remain peaceful, it marked the end of Chamberlain’s appeasement programme, and finally 
it presented many of the members with new employment opportunities. By the late summer 
of 1939, the Jewish Chronicle reported that many of the Bethnal Green and Shoreditch 
members had joined the armed forces.235 What is more, the policy of rearmament saw many 
of the East London members absorbed into factory life. Hackney, Canning Town and 
Stratford Marsh’s all became home to chemical plants and other forms of war production.236  
Other factors all became prominent reasons for the decline of the BUF in East London. Many 
supporters became concerned of being associated with a movement that was recognised as 
pro-German as the likelihood of war increased. Many naturally detracted away from political 
movements in general as the war became impending.  
The BUF became a party in decline after its financial struggles and municipal defeats in late 
1937. It attempted to reignite itself through peace campaigns that aimed to capture the anti-
war feeling that was still apparent after the First World War. The overriding fact was that 
foreign affairs and particularly European fascism overshadowed any threat that domestic 
fascism could bear on the British government. Whilst the BUF did invoke domestic interest 
for its cause and influence the government to keep a watchful eye on its movement, it failed 
to challenge or threaten the stability of the government.  
Fascism in East London, like in Yorkshire and Lancashire was heavily built on several 
heterogeneous forms. The support and the decline of Fascism in East London cannot be 
isolated to a single cause. Fascism developed in East London from social, economic, cultural 
                                                        
235 Extract from the Jewish Chronicle, 21 July 1939, in The National Archives in the Public 
Records Office, HO 144/21281/148. 
236 A. Palmer, The East End, Four Centuries of London Life (London, 1989), p. 146. 
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and ideological reasons. Fascism offered a place for those with morbid perceptions of 
national decline, Mosley’s imperial vision wanted to revitalise the national community 
through the strength of the Empire. Once the likelihood of war approached, Mosley’s 
imperial dreams were overshadowed by the prominent threat to peace. Others in East London 
recognised a decline in the local economy and found Mosley advocating the recovery of their 
industry.  
Once the economy began to stabilise and new job opportunities arrived through armament 
production, Mosley’s economic policies became less relevant. Some East Londoner’s had 
nostalgic motivations for joining the BUF, the decline of the community motivated by anti-
minority feeling as well as the physical challenge imposed by the anti-Fascist community at 
Cable Street led them onto a path of anti-Semitic feeling. Further to this, others joined 
Mosley’s anti-Semitic movement because of deeper anti-Semitic concerns that stemmed 
from wildly fanatical assumptions of Jewish behaviour, extending beyond the local issues. 
Others joined the movement because of its fashionable presence, resulting in it having more 
style than substance. The motives for fascism in East London were wide-ranging and 
complex, they cannot be collectively defined, consequently the movement could not unify 
and ever pose an electoral threat.  
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Conclusion 
The British Union of Fascists failed to gather sufficient momentum to challenge the 
mainstream political structure in the 1930s, although it gained influence in some regions. The 
BUF gained influence in East London, Yorkshire and Lancashire, yet its organisational 
structure fluctuated too often and its changes in political strategy often left members 
dissociating themselves from the party and reverting to the stable traditionalist parties.  
There was a heightened level of unrest within the local atmosphere in the early 1930s that 
needed addressing. The nation’s discontent varied across different regions, areas like Jarrow 
had unemployment levels as high as 80 per cent, yet had no interest in Fascism, for the 
Labour and the NUWM had a stronghold. This demonstrates that economic depression was 
not intrinsically linked to fascist support. Momentum for the BUF rested with the fluctuation 
of public opinion and partially due to the changing tide of the economy. People identified 
with the movement for several reasons, some cyclical in-line with their occupation, others 
down to their social aggregations with the Jewish population and others due to the social 
elements the BUF party offered, the challenge Mosley faced was tying these points together 
to create collective support at national level, something he failed to do.  
Local Mosleyite Fascism did not derive its ideological content or coherence from a single 
source. Mosley’s support developed out of the local ideological currents, it drew interest 
from a variety of local economic, social and political tensions.  
Oswald Mosley attempted to frantically put forward his radical manifesto, its doctrine 
ventured away from mainstream political parties. He offered a maverick solution that was 
more an attack on the institution than it was ownership of property. His advocacy for a ruling 
cabinet of five posed a significant threat to democracy. In making such radical claims, as 
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well as building support for an aggressive military style, he limited his influence to a small 
concentrated loyal core.  
The BUF attempted to compete with the Labour party over the working-class vote in East 
London, Yorkshire and Lancashire by appealing to the industrial workers struggling with the 
changing tides of their industry. To some degree this was successful pre-1934, the BUF 
movement was gathering support across the nation and attracting crowds within their tens of 
thousands, but it wasn’t politically successful. The politically engaged members were made 
up of families and the less militant sought, they identified with the movement for the 
economic change it promised to bring. When the party became increasingly violent and 
developed a deeper engagement with hatred and Fascist rhetoric, these members abandoned 
Mosley’s economic notions as they came at a high price. The country had recently 
experienced the tragedy of the Great War, it did not want to see violence at the roots of local 
election campaigns.  
Mosley was challenged with balancing the party’s militant aspects with its mainstream 
influence. The party fed off its militancy, attracting middle-class audiences who wanted a 
constructive alternative, yet it needed to keep this in check to avoid losing its wider support. 
It was Mosley and the BUF’s urgency and lust for change that separated it from other parties. 
Whilst the BUF’s fascist tendencies cost it support, it also influenced it in relative terms. 
Prior to Mosley’s indulgence in Fascist rhetoric, he unsuccessfully contested his ideas in the 
1931 general election with The New Party. The public showed little interest in The New 
Party, resulting in monthly financial losses driving the party and its weekly newspaper 
Action, to eventually cease in December the same year.237 Mosley’s personal political 
                                                        
237 Stevenson & Cook, The Slump, p. 199. 
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journey drove him to Fascism, he became increasingly frustrated with the barriers that 
prevented his policies moving forward.  
Some of the inhabitants of Lancashire, Yorkshire and East London supported the BUF 
because they were unsettled by their social surroundings. They did not share the same 
frustration with Britain’s political structure, their grievances were personal. The motivation 
to support the BUF could have derived from their economic suffering, the appeal was both 
politically and intellectual. Other militant types instinctively resisted the political violence at 
‘Cable Street’, whilst some felt the psychological belief that their community was under 
threat from an ‘alien’ deluge. The fascist movement was built up of multiple public 
frustrations, these frustrations were temporary and fluctuated in-line with one’s personal 
circumstances, the movement did not have a large enough core collective to cause the British 
government any serious concern.  
East London represented Mosley’s best opportunity to gather popular support. The frequency 
of the street confrontations, the public meetings and the public disorder were all reasons that 
resulted in fascism in East London being the most pronounced location in the country. The 
local election results of 1937 show Mosley had achieved significant backing, just not enough 
to break the natural voting tendencies of the electorate. The support for Mosley emerged out 
of anti-Semitic frustrations. The BUF invested a significant amount of time and effort into 
nurturing their policies around their anti-Semitic ideologies. No other regions received the 
level of effort and investment that East London did during Mosley’s anti-Semitic tirade. 
Indeed, T. Linehan argues that if it weren’t for the outbreak of war, areas such Bethnal Green 
North-East would have eventually elected a Fascist leader. 238  
                                                        
238 T. Linehan, East London for Mosley (London, 1996), p. 58, Stepney Reconstruction 
Group, Living in Stepney, p. 303. 
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In Lancashire, the BUF recruitment drive focused on the potential gains that could be made 
from supporting the cotton workers. The challenge with pledging the party to a socio-
economic issue was the fact that it was cyclical, by the end of 1934, Mosley had peaked in-
line with the severity of the economy in Lancashire. After 1934, the economy began to 
redeem itself and Mosley increasing lost the support of thousands of members. 
Yorkshire also had cyclical elements to the nature of its support. It did unquestionably create 
an appeal that addressed two specific issues, socio-economic and anti-Semitic. Yorkshire 
suffered economic crisis within the agricultural sector, this combined with the high 
settlement of Jews specifically in Leeds, 25,000 almost 5.5 per cent of its population, created 
animosity within the habitants of the county. Yet it failed to parallel any relative success in 
contrast to the strength of the East London campaign.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from every region where the BUF shared relative 
momentum was that the movement was composed of several heterogeneous and often 
conflicting forms. It was because of this that the movement never won or became close to 
winning popular support. The movement was bound and limited to its local causes. Its 
violent approach influenced the politically engaged to resist Mosley, whilst also forcing the 
politically disengaged to abandon his ideas for the same reason. The movement was built on 
an ideology that gathered more nationwide opposition than support. The British Union of 
Fascists was not equipped for a prolonged political struggle of attrition with stable 
democratic parties.  
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